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ABSTRACT
Using the testimonies surrounding the Development, Relief, and Education for
Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act) as a primary case study, this project provides a
rhetorical investigation of the interplay between narratives, nation building, national
identity, policymaking, and the American immigrant. This project first identifies the
grand narrative of exclusionary nationalism as the primary narrative constituting the
American identity. Then, this project examines the rhetoric of policymakers to
demonstrate how an Anglo-Saxonized, elitist notion of American identity is rhetorically
constituted by assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses. Moreover, it
argues policymakers maintain the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism
through restrictive immigration policies aimed at subjugating immigrant “Others”
believed to threaten the homogeneity of the national ideal. Finally, this project
investigates the material consequences of upholding exclusionary nationalism as the
dominant national narrative, and provides rhetorical suggestions for DREAM Act
advocates who wish to challenge its narrative dominance in order to constitute an
inclusive American identity, control the public debate on comprehensive immigration
reform, and liberate all non-White immigrant “Others” from their marginalized position.
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Introduction
Constituting Nations and Narrative Policy Formation

As a multiracial and multicultural society built on immigration, both voluntary
and involuntary, the United States’ acceptance of its immigrant culture has been easier in
principle than in practice. Beginning in the nineteenth century, U.S. policymakers have
been involved in heated debates about whom they should permit to enter, reside, and
naturalize within the country’s borders. 1 Over 200 years later, these highly publicized
disputes regarding immigration remain at the forefront of political controversy, providing
considerable space in which scholars may investigate the rhetorical constitution,
maintenance, and reconstruction of the immigrant.
The immigrant body has been rhetorically managed by U.S. policymakers since
the 1800’s. As international migration into the United States has increased over time, the
rhetorical meaning of the immigrant has transformed from hero and dreamer to thief and
social leech. Immigrants have been both celebrated for their courageous pursuit of a
better life as well as blamed for the demise of national culture, health, and economic
stability. The state has crafted the dominant discourses and definitions of immigration,
leaving marginalized immigrant populations to rhetorically negotiate their own
meanings. 2 According to rhetorical scholars Kent Ono and John Sloop, “[immigration]
rhetoric shifts borders, changing what [borders] mean publicly, influencing public policy,
altering the ways borders affect people, and circumscribing political responses.” 3 Taken
further, rhetoric determines where, and what, the border and its people are. Thus,
understanding the ways in which the U.S. immigration debate takes place within the
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country’s discursive and rhetorical boundaries is critical to the creation of contemporary
immigration policy.
Law is best understood as a subjectively informed branch of rhetoric by which
communities and cultures are created, sustained, and transformed. Legal scholar James
Boyd White contends, “[Law] is a language in which our perceptions of the natural
universe are constructed and related, in which our values and motives are defined, and in
which our methods of reasoning are elaborated and enacted.” 4 Law is historically and
culturally situated, representing the prevailing beliefs of its time, though many people
view the U.S. legal system as a neutral, objective, and value-free “machine acting on the
rest of the world.” 5 Citizens and noncitizens become the objects upon which the system
of rules is enacted. They have the choice to follow or defy the law, each action resulting
in a series of institutionally pre-defined consequences. Furthermore, leaders within the
bureaucratic governing body are in a position of political superiority and have the
opportunity to create the policies that affect the lives of citizens and noncitizens. It is in
this act of policy creation that the machine metaphor is invalidated and the importance of
the subjectivity of law emerges. Law is not merely “a fixed body of knowledge, but . . . a
performance that tells both of rhetorical practice and of itself being told.” 6
While the language of law may be determined by multiple rhetorical constructs,
the primary influence on policy formation is the narrative. Rhetorician Walter R. Fisher
contends, “We experience and comprehend life as a series of ongoing narratives, as
conflicts, characters, beginnings, middles, and ends. The various modes of
communication—all forms of symbolic action—then may be seen as stories.” 7 He
emphasizes the importance of “narrative probability,” whether or not a story is coherent,
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and “narrative fidelity,” whether or not a story is truthful, as being fundamental in the
transformation of a narrative into action. 8 Fisher proposes this narrative paradigm as a
philosophy of reason, value, and action necessary for “transforming technical logic and
empirical knowledge into a force for civilized existence.” 9 A story that exhibits both
probability and fidelity has the ability remain viable as long as historical circumstances
permit.
Most researchers have focused purely on the discursive formations of narratives;
however, John Lucaites and Celeste Condit argue for a functional study of narratives. 10 In
order to understand how narratives “function in and act upon the meaning and structures
of culture and society,” scholars must move away from the dominant poetic models of
narratives and shift towards a rhetorical conception of narration. 11 By reestablishing the
ancient Roman tradition of narratio, scholars gain a critical vantage point from which to
explore the narrative’s role in the transformation of social and political consciousness,
something which the more poetic and literary traditions of narrative theory ignore. The
core of the rhetorical narrative is the way in which a narrator persuades his or her
audience by using “cultural fragments . . . [to invite] participation in [his or her] vision of
the social world.” 12 This project investigates such rhetorical functions of narrative theory,
focusing on the relationship between the narrator, the speech, the audience, the occasion,
and the change. Furthermore, it examines how the rhetorical narrative serves “as an
interpretive lens through which the audience is asked to view and understand the
verisimilitude of the propositions and proof before it.” 13 Rhetorical narratives provide a
lens into the past, help to create future visions, and orient audiences to particular a
historical moment. Viewed this way, narratives inform law by constructing historical and
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political reality for its policymakers; therefore, law, in turn, is constructed based on this
perceived reality. There cannot be a law without “a real story about real people actually
located in time and space and culture . . . that is where the law begins.” 14 Law, then,
becomes historically salient through the multiple narratives that communicate the stories
of people and their relationship to one another at any given time.
Perhaps the most influential narrative informing law is that of “the nation.”
Historian Benedict Anderson sees the nation as an “imagined community,” a cultural
phenomenon by which political ideologies are established through language. 15 He argues
nations and nationalisms are “cultural artifacts of a particular kind” that have evolved in
both meaning and enactment throughout history. 16 Sociologist Anthony D. Smith adds,
“Of all the visions and faiths that compete for men’s [sic] loyalties in the modern world,
the most widespread and persistent is the national ideal . . . none has been so successful in
penetrating to every part of the globe, and in its ability to attract to its ideals men and
women of every sort, in all walks of life and in every country.” 17 Although the notion of
nation is slippery, many scholars agree that the essence of the nation is constituted by
“the people.” Sociologist Walker Connor adds that essence of the nation is “a
psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it” from others. 18 Historian Eric
Hobsbawm believes nations are a “dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above,
but which cannot be understood unless also [analyzed] from below.” 19 Only through an
analysis of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings, and interests of ordinary people, as
well as how these ideals are communicated, may scholars attempt to define the multiple
meanings of nation. Furthermore, the complex ways in which human beings rhetorically
define and redefine themselves as members of the nation precedes the existence of the
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nation itself. This claim that nations are first and foremost socially constituted, both by
the elite and the ordinary subject, emphasizes the role of narratives in the construction the
nation. As people and their stories evolve so too does the national narrative and,
consequently, the construction of law.
Central to this investigation is Connor’s description of the United States as the
archetype of the “immigrant state” characterized by the narratives of its immigrating
peoples. 20 He claims the national ideals of the United States have been shaped by the
many narratives accompanying the assimilation of the country’s highly variegated
population. Furthermore, Anderson describes the “creole” nation of the United States as
being “formed and led by people who shared a common language and common descent
with those against whom they fought.” 21 Differing greatly from provincial European
conceptions of nationalism based on linguistics, creole nations were among the first to
develop conceptions of nation-ness because their collective national conscious focused on
the concept of “us” versus “them.” Thus, an “imagined community” was at once created
in the minds of early Americans, establishing a hegemonic nation from its very inception
and creating a dominant national narrative that would constitute U.S. policy throughout
history. Rhetorician James Boyd White terms this evolutionary, rhetorical process of
nation-building “constitutive rhetoric.” 22
The rhetorical positioning of subjects is central to investigating the constitutive
processes of nation-building. Rhetorical scholar Maurice Charland contends social
subjects are as much a “rhetorical effect” as the texts they write and critique. 23 Theorists
must consider how groups come to identify themselves as well as how the process of
identification affects the powers of national discourse. The ways in which subjects are
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rhetorically constituted is central to understanding how U.S. policymakers have assumed
a national identity for their people, as well as how those people have assumed the same
national identity for themselves. This shared national identity is an ideology enacted by
its subjects as they reconstitute its image in their material world via constitutive rhetoric.
The concept of constitutive rhetoric is inherently ideological because it creates the
narratives subjects inhabit and, most importantly, “[inserts] ‘narratized’ subjects-asagents into the world.” 24 Thus, nations are imagined communities rhetorically constituted
by their “narratized” subjects.
In the case of the United States, the “narratized” subject of the immigrant has
been a rhetorically evolving subject since the country’s inception. During the seventeenth
century, the New World saw millions of settlers from areas including Scotland, Ireland,
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Russia, Poland, Scandinavia, Greece, China,
Japan, Africa, and Latin America; however, those Protestants from England were the first
to successfully colonize the new land. 25 British settlers quickly realized the economic
benefit to encouraging significant members of their home country to travel to the New
World. Though the Dutch, French, and Spanish claimed large empires of land, the British
encouraged its people to cross the Atlantic for the reported “golden opportunities” via
strategic policies, setting in motion the greatest population movement in history and
quickly establishing a dominant culture of English Protestantism in the mainland
colonies. 26 Though the English government was generally tolerant of newcomers, British
colonists were not as gracious towards those immigrants from varying backgrounds. As
the British colonists searched for economic opportunity and freedom from religious
persecution, they also feared the arrival of those different than themselves would corrupt
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their established customs and upset the balance of society. Even prior to the writing of the
Constitution, state laws such as the 1698 South Carolina law that gave bounties to all
newcomers except Scots-Irish and Roman Catholicism were established to subvert the
immigration of non-English Protestants in state-instituted policies. 27 Though the faces of
feared newcomers have changed overtime—from Scots-Irish to Italians, Chinese, Jews,
African Americans, Poles, Puerto Ricans, Irish, and Mexicans—the settlers of colonial
America established a paradox which still holds true today: “whereas on the one hand we
have welcomed strangers to work and live among us, on the other hand we have scorned
and abused immigrants or minority groups who have deviated from the dominant
culture.” 28 The narrative that immigrants will subvert the dominant culture and threaten
the process of nation-building has been repeated generation after generation in the United
States, constituting policies addressing the flow of immigrants into its borders.
The narrative of immigrant subversion not only constituted policy, but also
bolstered the narratives of U.S. national unity, national development, national citizenship,
and national preservation through racially-based tactics. 29 Legal scholar Ian F. Haney
López argues, “Race mediates our politics. It alters electoral boundaries, shapes the
disbursement of local, state, and federal funds, fuels the creation and collapse of political
alliances, and twists the conduct of law enforcement . . . it mediates every aspect of our
lives.” 30 The influence of race on the national narrative establishes socially constructed
racial hierarchies of power in which “Whiteness” is rendered as superior and “nonWhites” are assigned to an inferior status, often “excluding [non-Whites] altogether from
the social, political, and cultural life of a nation.” 31 Historically, United States has
established racial hierarchies through a notion of White superiority that has been
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recognized and upheld by courts and is perpetuated in all socio-economic levels of
society, beginning with the founding documents of the nation such as the Constitution. 32
Racial theorists Michael Omi and Howard Winant investigate this “racial
formation” of U.S. policy as they argue the creation of a White, Anglo-Saxon hegemonic
national ideal established a “color code” of racial distinctions reinforcing colonial
domination hidden under the auspices of nation-building. 33 Racial oppression was
considered a national imperative legitimized by the right to self-determination and liberty
of a small, but self-asserted privileged, group of people who exploited and excluded all
others in order to maintain their position of national power through policy. For example,
the U.S. government’s first attempt to define American citizenship, the Naturalization
Act of 1790, was inherently racial as it specified only White immigrants could qualify for
citizenship. 34 Influenced by the dominant cultural assumptions of a homogenous U.S.
national identity, this Act perpetuated divisive social hierarchies favoring Anglo-Saxons
and northern Europeans while sealing the fate for Asian, African, and eastern European
immigrants as second-class immigrants. Such racially informed policies enforce racial
politics at all levels of society as policymakers administer, negotiate, and encode racial
hierarchies into law, making a system of racial ideology an institutionalized, permanent
feature of U.S. society.
Though the racially-based narratives of United States are psychologically and
rhetorically imagined, they have finite boundaries by which other nations and identities
are excluded. Often policy makers disguise the racially-informed narratives of immigrant
subversion within the narrative of legality, a narrative that legitimizes the exclusion of
those unwilling or unable to adhere to the dominant Anglo-Saxon narrative of nation. In
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the case of immigrants who are inside the United States but outside the law, a definition
of legal disobedience emerges. A simple act of crossing the physical border of the nation
without legal documentation, or remaining inside the border after the expiry of legal
status, constructs the immigrant in a perpetual state of disobedience to the law. Thus, the
identity of the illegal immigrant is manufactured through policy as well as rhetorically
constituted as a disobedient member of a legal nation through the process of
“Othering.” 35 They are rhetorically constructed as “inherently un-American, perhaps
even anti-American. Their continued presence threatens the national body from
within.” 36 Social theorist Tomás Summers Sandoval states, “If ‘we’ are a nation of laws
and law-abiding people, and if (by definition) illegal immigrants are not following these
laws, then ‘they’ are not and cannot become part of the nation.” 37 This process of
“Othering” is dangerous as it creates a “fixed, binding, and immutable” definition for
illegal immigrants, leaving little room for them to negotiate their own situation. 38
Sandoval argues the discourse of disobedience “undergirds the rationale of the U.S.
system of immigration regulation, shaping both policy and the lives of unauthorized
migrants.” 39 Therefore, investigating the interplay of constitutive rhetoric, law, and the
establishment of the national narrative is critical to understanding the rhetorical situation
of the immigrant within contemporary U.S. immigration policy.
Law is not only informed by narratives, it also exerts control over its narratives
through discipline. According to philosopher Michel Foucault, law is not imposed but
rather used as a series of tactics in order to achieve a desired end. 40 In the case of
immigration, law serves as a series of rhetorical and political tactics to define, monitor,
and control the immigrant body, thereby reducing the body to “the place it occupies, the
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interval it covers, the regularity, the good order according to which it operates its
movements.” 41 Using Foucault’s scholarship, point of entry (POE) inspection procedures
and decision-making at the border are reiterations of the practices of record-keeping and
writing which serve as a “means of control and a method of domination” objectifying and
subjectifying the immigrant. 42 Through a system of “intense registration and of
documentary accumulation,” the immigrant body becomes a “describable, analyzable,
object” controlled in order to regulate its movement and neutralize the possibility of
counter-powers forming and challenging the dominant power of state. 43 The mundane
practices of inspection serve as regimes of power that organize the body in space and
schedule every movement through rules, regulations, check points, and documentation.
Immigrant bodies are classified by the state according to sex, age, skills, citizenship, and
immigrant intent; therefore, upon entry, the bodies at once become subordinated subjects
under the law. This subjugation of the body becomes the norm as immigrants internalize
the power of the state and its disciplines, constituting an identity of obedience and
placing themselves under the surveillance of the law. This surveillance is not merely a
gaze, but a reification of the borders of power that reduce its objects to symbolic spaces
in which this power is enacted, and consequently immigrants become both the objects of
surveillance as well as the agents through which the active principle surveillance is
realized. 44
Foucault argues people are distributed along a scale around societal norms and
then positioned within a hierarchical structure of power according to whether or not they
adhere to these norms. When necessary, some people are altogether disqualified from this
hierarchy of power in order to more clearly define those who remain within the norm and
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maintain a position of power. In the case of immigration, the concept of “illegality”
emerges as a means to “sum up symbolically all the others” who fall outside the
conventional boundaries of the law and power. 45 Illegality, then, is especially useful in
regulating the behavior of delinquent immigrant bodies, and the state is responsible for
this regulation of behavior. With more than 10.8 million “illegal aliens” residing in the
United States in 2009, the state is charged with managing the mass phenomenon of
illegality if it wishes to maintain its dominant hierarchical status of power. 46 Thus, how a
state rhetorically defines itself and its people in relation to other states and their people is
paramount to creating policy, particularly in the case of immigration. This project seeks
to identity the various ways in which nation-building has constructed U.S. immigrant
identities as well as how policies have managed these identities through tactics of
discipline and control.
An Exploration of the Narrative, Nation, and the Immigrant within the
Rhetoric Surrounding the DREAM Act: Research Goals and Primary Case Study
Understanding law as a rhetorically constitutive process, both informed by and
informing of multiple narratives within civil society is paramount to this investigation.
Through an investigation of the narrative construction of law, I explore the rhetorical coconstruction of the immigrant body and immigration policy in the United States from the
eighteenth century to the first decade of the twenty first century. I investigate the
interplay among narratives, the formation and implementation of immigration policy, and
the disciplining of the immigrant body from a rhetorical perspective by asking, What is
the role of the narrative in the strategic formation of immigration policy and how have
narrative representations of the immigrant affected the disciplining of the immigrant
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body through policy? Central to my thesis is the immigrant representation as “Other,” of
being outside the dominant narrative of national citizen; therefore, requiring surveillance
and control via restrictive policies.
I begin this project by tracing the rhetorical history of United States immigration
policy, exploring how various cultural and political national narratives have transformed
the legal and social definitions of immigration over time. Using White, Fisher, Charland,
and others, I discuss the constitutive rhetoric that surrounded the early discourse on the
relationship between the nation and the immigrant. I trace how and when the U.S.
immigrant was first recognized and as well as how the narrative of immigration has
developed throughout U.S. history.
In chapter one I explore the shifting intersections between immigration policy and
U.S. national identity-making beginning in the eighteenth century to present day.
Specifically, I investigate how the dominant narrative of “exclusionary nationalism” is
manifested within immigration policy, creating cultural and social relations of power
while constituting the national narrative as inherently Anglo-Saxon and elitist. 47 In
addition, I use the work of Foucault and other scholars to argue the immigrant body is
disciplined by policies informed by this imagined, yet dominant, homogeneous narrative
of nation. Ultimately, I seek to expose the exclusive policies and practices by which the
U.S. national identity has been strategically defined by the elite. This rhetorical analysis
of the shifting narratives of U.S. national identity and immigration will provide the
context needed for my principal examination of the discourses surrounding the
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act).

12

Chapter two moves towards a comprehensive textual analysis of my primary
source: the 2007 House congressional hearing regarding the DREAM Act presented
before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and
International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. The DREAM Act, in its various
forms, lifts the ban on postsecondary education benefits placed by the 1996 Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and allows for certain
unauthorized alien students to adjust their U.S. immigration status to legal permanent
resident (LPR) through higher education, military service, or employment. In my
rhetorical examination of the testimony surrounding the DREAM Act, I will consider the
following questions: What are the major rhetorical themes and patterns used by
supporters and opponents of the DREAM Act? How do these themes and patterns
(re)construct the meaning of the immigrant, and for whom is it (re)constructed? What are
the political consequences of this (re)construction? I conclude the project with an
analysis of the material consequences of the rhetoric surrounding the DREAM Act and
the comprehensive immigration reform movement, and provide rhetorical suggestions for
the future of the movement.
I seek to make a valuable contribution to the conversations surrounding the
creation and implementation of immigration policy by investigating the relationship
between narratives and immigration. In critiquing current rhetorical and discursive
methods of persuasion within the U.S. immigration debate, one can identify problematic
devices and change the direction of policymaking for future generations. Through a
historical and rhetorical analysis of U.S. immigration policy and the contemporary
discourses of the DREAM Act, I argue the dominant narrative of exclusionary
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nationalism controls the public debate on immigration reform. Additionally, I
demonstrate the ways in which immigrant “Others” fail to resist the narrative dominance
of exclusionary nationalism and, therefore, fail to challenge their marginalization from
the national narrative. In investigating the rhetorical construction of the immigrant body
through the DREAM Act, I provide new insights into the rhetorical implications of the
DREAM Act on the larger public debate on immigration reform as well as demonstrate
how the Act currently fails to redefine the immigrant body for both policymakers and the
public. Ultimately, this project offers a varying prospective from which to evaluate the
current and future states of U.S immigration policy and provides a new rhetorical
direction for actors involved in the public debate on immigration reform.
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Chapter One
Exclusionary Nationalism and a Rhetorical History of Immigration Control

“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free . . .
send these, the homeless, tempted-tossed, to me: I lift my lamp beside the golden
door.”—Poem by Emma Lazarus inscribed on the Statue of Liberty.

Since the country’s inception, Emma Lazarus’ poem has symbolized acceptance
and hospitality for hopeful immigrants journeying to the United States; however, many
immigrants do not find the welcome as described in Emma Lazarus’ poem and, instead,
encounter an elite narrative of American citizenry from which they are systematically and
rhetorically excluded. Historian Walker Connor argues the strategy of American conquest
during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries combined with the pattern of
early settlement “created a dominant, almost exclusive Anglo-Saxon culture” that sought
to eliminate all other cultural competitors, especially those seeking to migrate from
competing nations. 48 Such competitors, often referred to as “minorities,” have been
perceived by Anglo-Saxon leaders as dangerous ethnic threats to the balance of power
relations. According to this theory of ethnic competition, the stronger the perceived
ethnic threat, the more likely nationalist attitudes and exclusionist reactions develop
within the dominant culture. 49 In the case of the United States, the perceived threat has
remained high since the colonial period when the population was comprised primarily of
British Protestants whose leaders established an exclusive claim on the state in order to
minimize the perceived threat of non-British, non-English speaking minorities. 50 As
increasing heterogeneous ethnic populations immigrated into the United States, Anglo-
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Saxon leaders institutionalized rhetorical systems of exclusion in order to reinforce the
established dominance of their desired homogeneous national narrative.
The Founding Fathers created an Anglo-Saxon narrative of American nationalism
when they established a new sense of national identity through the drafting of documents
that defined the new nation. Foreign settlers had once been considered transplanted
“emigrants” from Europe seeking to establish a new community in the image of the
society they left behind. However, at the end of the eighteenth century, the Founding
Fathers constituted a collective American national identity through the writing of the
Constitution, and in their debates over national inclusion they began calling newcomers
“immigrants.” 51 Historian Benedict Anderson explains the rhetorical creation of an
“official nationalism” is an “anticipatory” strategy of exclusion enacted by a “dominant
[group] which [is] threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging
nationally-imagined community.” 52 When the population of immigrants began to double
at the turn of the century, the Founding Fathers feared their rapidly increasing presence
would damage the new and fragile American nationalism.
The Founding Fathers believed uncontrolled migration would damage the newly
constituted Anglicized American identity. Thomas Jefferson referred to the perceived
threat of immigrants in his 1781 “Notes on the State of Virginia,” arguing that
“[foreigners] will bring with them the principles of the governments they leave, imbided
in their early youth. . . . These principles, with their language, they will transmit to their
children. . . . They will infuse into it their spirit, warp and bias its directions, and render it
a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.” 53 Jefferson feared large numbers of
immigrants would threaten the cultural and political homogeneity of the Anglo-Saxon
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national identity, thus he advocated for the “natural propagation” of population from the
“desired” people born of British “stock” currently residing in the United States rather
than immigrants in order to maintain a more “homogenous, more peaceable, more
durable” government.” 54 Benjamin Franklin mirrored Jefferson’s concerns when he
wrote of the influx of German-speaking immigrants in 1793, remarking, “Those who
come hither are generally of the most ignorant Stupid Sort of their own Nation . . . now
they come in droves. They will soon so outnumber us, that all the advantages we have
will not [in My Opinion] be able to preserve our language, and even our Government will
become precarious.” 55 Like Jefferson, Franklin was concerned that the “droves” of
immigrants would prevent the establishment of a coherent, Anglo-Saxon national
narrative. Franklin worried about issues concerning language, and he also feared that
unrestricted immigration would threaten the stability of the government. In both
Jefferson’s and Franklin’s opinions, immigration admitted culturally threatening peoples
who weakened the durability of the Anglo-Saxon national narrative of the budding
nation.
The Founding Fathers believed assimilation was the primary means of ensuring
the newly established government created in the Anglo-Saxon image would prevail. For
example, President George Washington expressed his opinion on immigration and
assimilation in a letter to Vice President John Adams in 1794, noting,“[Foreigners] retain
the [l]anguage, habits and principles (good or bad) which they bring with them. Whereas
by an intermixture with our people, they, or their descendants, get assimilated to our
customs, measures and laws: in a word, soon become one people.” 56 This concept of “one
people” is described by social theorist Christian Joppke as the process of establishing a
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national identity through a “notion of ‘ownership’ of the state” by which membership of
the state is determined by a particular nation or ethnic group at the cost of “excluding all
non-national or non-ethnic others.” 57 According to Washington, all persons entering the
United States should become “one people” through the adoption of Anglo-Saxon
principles of government. By establishing the Anglo-Saxon political and cultural identity
as the dominant national identity, Jefferson, Franklin, and Washington rhetorically
enacted Joppke’s “notion of ownership” and constituted a homogenous, exclusive
national identity vulnerable to the increasing numbers of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants.
The Founding Fathers institutionalized their Anglo-Saxon national vision when
they offered the first legislative definition of American nationality in the Naturalization
Act of 1790. The Act limited naturalization privileges to “free white” immigrants only,
requiring two years of residency from these “free white” immigrants before citizenship
could be claimed. 58 Racial scholars Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue the
Naturalization Act of 1790 was the country’s first “racial policy” as it excluded select
populations based on their racial heritage from the privileges of citizenship, thereby
excluding racial “Others” from the American national narrative. 59 By constituting
Whiteness as a prerequisite of citizenship, the Act widened the gap between free
Americans and those who remained in slavery. 60 Thomas Jefferson justified racial
inequality under the law in his “Notes on Virginia,” commenting, “I advance . . . that the
blacks . . . are inferior to the Whites in the endowments both of body and mind. . . . This
unfortunate difference of colour, and perhaps faculty, is a power obstacle to the
emancipation of these people.” 61 Jefferson’s ideas on race echoed the philosophers of the
European Enlightenment who privileged European ancestry over all others in order to
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justify acts of colonization during the Age of Exploration. 62 In the same way, Jefferson
used race to validate the exclusion of slaves, native peoples, and other non-Whites from
the national narrative of American citizenry as well as to legitimize the exploitative
system of slavery. 63
Additionally, the Naturalization Act of 1790 targeted non-White voluntary
immigrants for exclusion because they were considered threats to national homogeneity
and stability. Alexander Hamilton argued, “The safety of the republic depends essentially
on the energy of a common National sentiment. . . . Some reasonable term ought to be
allowed to enable aliens to get rid of foreign and acquire American attachments; to learn
the principles and imbide the spirit of our government.” 64 Non-White voluntary
immigrants brought with them habits and customs from their home countries that
endangered the formation of a collective national identity; therefore, the residency
requirements that mandated immigrants reside in the United States for two years
promoted assimilation into the Anglo-Saxon national narrative and upheld the AngloSaxon position of power during an era of nation-building. Through the establishment of
residency requirements and the restriction of eligibility for naturalization based on race,
the Founding Fathers relegated non-Whites to an inferior status, institutionalizing a White
collectivity of national belonging and setting a precedence of maintaining national
exclusivity through policy for centuries to follow.
The Founding Fathers were the nation’s first formal narrators of the Anglicized
American national narrative, postulating about the unified, homogenous Anglo-Saxon
identity as being the key to building a successful government and nation. The dominant
narrative told by the Founding Fathers was that of “exclusionary nationalism,” a
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rhetorical strategy by which members of a preferred system of racial and class hierarchies
produce a dominant national narrative to maintain power. 65 In this chapter, I argue that
the narrative of exclusionary nationalism favors the privileged few who occupy the top
hierarchical positions within society, granting them the power to rhetorically construct
and enforce their own hegemonic narrative of what it means to be American. In exploring
over two hundred years of immigration policy, I investigate how the narrative of
exclusionary nationalism has manufactured an exclusive, White American national
identity based on the inadmissibility of targeted minorities through selective immigration
policy. I identify four key features of exclusionary nationalism—assimilationism, racism,
xenophobia, and classism—and examine how these features rhetorically constitute the
dominant narrative of American identity. Using Foucault, I theorize how the story of
exclusionary nationalism results in the surveillance and biological control of immigrant
“Others” excluded from the national identity. I argue that immigration policy is
constituted by exclusionary nationalism and serves as the primary mechanism for the
surveillance and control of the immigrant “Other,” thereby maintaining the dominance of
the exclusive narrative that informs it. Taking from Charland’s theory of rhetorical
subject making, I contend the immigrant “Other” is a “narratized” subject constituted by
restrictive policy, procedure, and the everyday reproduction of citizenship norms for the
purpose of ideological control. Finally, I interrogate the rhetorical arguments enacted by
policymakers, the principal actors responsible for the institutionalization of exclusionary
nationalism, for the purpose of maintaining the Anglo-Saxon notion of American national
identity.
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Narrative Features of Exclusionary Nationalism
Policymakers enact the narrative of exclusionary nationalism to rhetorically
construct a homogenous national identity for the purpose of maintaining political power.
Cultural theorist Stuart Hall argues that national identities are rhetorical products of
varying cultural elements serving as “discursive devices” by which difference or unity is
constituted. 66 The purpose of creating a unified national identity is to uphold power
relations by creating a cohesive national narrative that “transcends the limitations of the
individual body and will” and remains intact over time. 67 Rhetorician Maurice Charland
argues such rhetorically constructed national identities become “transhistorical subjects”
and establish a “collectivity” among people able to transcend any given historical
moment. 68 In the case of the United States, policymakers have sought to establish a
hegemonic national identity in their own image for the purpose of creating unity and
maintaining their position of power. I highlight the discourses within this process that
have been utilized by presidents representing popular sentiment and setting the agenda
for Congress as well as the congressional leaders who, then, institutionalize exclusionary
nationalism through policy. As leadership shifts, so should the narrative of exclusionary
nationalism; however, the primary features of the homogenous, Anglicized national
identity institutionalized by Founding Fathers ensured a dominant narrative of
exclusionary nationalism would transcend history.
Assimilationism
Assimilationism is the first rhetorical feature of exclusionary nationalism and it is
the rhetorical process by which minority groups discard their unique cultural identity and
absorb the values of the dominant culture. Beginning in the eighteenth century, political
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leaders have expected immigrants to take on Anglo-Saxon social and political democratic
values in order to “become” American. The popular metaphor of the “melting pot”
romanticizes the process of assimilation in the United States by creating an inclusive
image of diverse cultural ingredients effortlessly blending together to form a unified
nation; however, historian Desmond King argues the “melting pot” metaphor has “neither
been an open or inclusive process” and, instead, has precluded diversity by preventing
undesirable ethnic groups from assimilating while privileging others. 69 Those privileged
for assimilation possessed the cultural markers of a “desirable American”—“White in
race, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ in speech and surname, and Protestant in religion”—while those
excluded possessed qualities outside of the WASP norm. 70 The WASP ethnicity,
however, was a rhetorically constructed myth because it overlooked the true ethnic
origins of Europeans. Ethnic scholar Winthrop Jordan argues that eighteenth and
nineteenth century Americans identified themselves as “modified Englishmen”
descending from a pure ethnic background rather than a mixture of the European
ancestors, some of whom were African, who originally settled England. Just as they
ignored the dynamics of the cultural amalgamation that took place in Europe, so-called
Anglo-Saxons disregarded the same process taking place in America. 71 This cultural and
historical ignorance resulted in the exclusion of immigrants who shared racial traits but
differed ideologically from Anglo-Saxon principles, as well as those immigrants who
shared ideological traits but differed racially. These strategic patterns of exclusion
constituted the myth of Anglo-Saxonism as “American” and preserved the rhetorical
prominence of exclusionary nationalism.
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Racism
The privilege of assimilability into the American national narrative is intrinsically
linked to one’s European heritage, making racism—the social construction and
preservation of White privilege—a primary rhetorical feature of exclusionary
nationalism. Racial scholars Michael Omi and Howard Winant claim that “the state is
inherently racial” and is “the pre-eminent site of racial conflict;” therefore, all narratives
generated by the state are racially-based. 72 Narratives based upon exclusionary
nationalism privilege the dominance of Whites over non-White “Others.” 73 Whiteness,
then, is best defined as a narrative construct, “a function of what people believe, a
mutable category tied to particular historical moments, a mechanism for excluding those
of unfamiliar origin,” existing only as a superior antonym to non-Whiteness. 74 The
rhetorical power of Whiteness is created by those who construct it, and in the case of
American exclusionary nationalism, White policymakers from Anglo-Saxon background
were the first to imagine and constitute its political dominance.
In the context of immigration, the definition of Whiteness has shifted over time as
various groups of immigrants have been rhetorically (re)defined within its racial borders.
The Founding Fathers established the first White racial category in their own AngloSaxon image; however, during the influx of non-Anglo European immigrants in the
nineteenth century, the definition of White was expanded first to those of Englishspeaking countries and then to all immigrants of Caucasian heritage. 75 This nineteenth
century “racial order” drew the line of Whiteness around Western Europe rather than
within the culturally diverse countries of Europe because the majority of these
immigrants possessed physical and cultural features more closely related to WASPs than
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those of the existing non-Whites (Native Americans, Africans, and Asians). 76 In addition,
coding the majority of Europeans as “Whites” strengthened existing exclusive institutions
built on White/non-White binaries such as slavery and the Chinese coolie trade. By
widening the gap between Whites and non-Whites in the United States, the White state
justified its own preeminence and institutionalized a binary system of race relations,
establishing and preserving a privileged White narrative of exclusionary nationalism.
Xenophobia
The establishment of the White/non-White binary in the American narrative of
exclusion perpetuates apprehension among Whites towards the potentially threatening
non-White “Other,” constituting xenophobia as a third feature of exclusionary
nationalism. Xenophobia is characterized by an irrational fear or hatred of racial “Others”
and is expressed through discourses that unite Whites against non-White immigrant
“Others.” Philosopher Michel Foucault argues that discourses “keep the [feared] object at
a distance, differentiating oneself from it . . . protecting oneself from it. . . and destroying
it through hatred” in order to keep the collective power and unity of Whites while
ensuring the inferiority of the non-White immigrant “Other.” 77 This process of
“Othering” rhetorically constitutes the immigrant as a feared object requiring control and
deserving of destruction in order to defend the existing racial hierarchy. Exclusionary
nationalism as a xenophobic narrative reinforces the differences of culture and race
within the context of fear. In the United States, xenophobic narratives ran rampant among
nativist groups during the nineteenth and twentieth century, perpetuating the Anglicized
national narrative as socially, economically, and politically superior to all others. 78 NonWhite immigrants deemed threatening to American sovereignty were criminalized,
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marginalized through discourses of disease, and relegated to second and third class
statuses via xenophobic narratives. These narratives were popular not only among nativist
groups but also among policymakers, resulting in a string of xenophobic immigration
policies. 79 Such policies institutionalized the xenophobic narrative of exclusionary
nationalism, reinforcing the Anglicized, White narrative as the dominant national
narrative.
Classism
In addition to cultural and racial tensions forming an exclusive national narrative,
class antagonisms between White laborers and non-White immigrants greatly inform the
narrative of exclusionary nationalism. Classism, a fourth feature of exclusionary
nationalism, is inextricably intertwined with discourses of race and nation. The
preservation of a hegemonic national narrative depends on the maintenance of White
economic superiority over all other competitors that threaten the Anglo-Saxon cultural,
racial, and economic positions of power. Foreign laborers become targets of control in
order to preserve the privileged economic position of American (White) laborers. Racial
historian Tomás Almaguer states, “Racialized hostility against [immigrant] laborers is
best understood in light of the way class-based interests among European Americans
were defined in relation to its immigrant population.” 80 Beginning with the influx of
Chinese immigrants during the 1800’s, White laborers believed non-White foreign
laborers threatened their unstable class position as well as the underlying racial
entitlements that White supremacy had reserved for them. Such fears manifested
themselves within the narrative of exclusionary nationalism and immigrant laborers
became the targets of vicious discursive attacks against their racial and biological
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inferiority. For example, Chinese migration was described as a “yellow plague” that
threatened the health of both the racial and economic power of White laborers. 81
Policymakers responded to the concerns of White laborers, implementing restrictive
immigration policies to slow down the migration of foreign laborers and preserve
economic opportunities for White workers. 82 Classism, as a feature of exclusionary
nationalism, is institutionalized via immigration policy and upholds the Anglo-Saxon
position of economic power while reinforcing the exclusion of non-Whites from future
capitalist opportunities.
These key features of exclusionary nationalism—assimilationism, racism,
xenophobia, and classism—are institutionalized through the multiple discursive and
systemic technologies of immigration control. Foucault speaks of discourse as a
phenomenon occurring within the established order of things; however, he is argues that
narrators give discourse its power. 83 Policymakers have historically narrated the
discourse of exclusionary nationalism, creating the narrative’s power through the
institution of immigration policies that define, restrict, and manage immigration in the
United States. In this way, immigration law provides the text for understanding the ways
in which policymakers craft definitions of national belonging. According to feminist
scholar Eithne Luibhéid, “Immigration control is not just a powerful symbol of
nationhood and people but also a means to literally construct the nation and people in
particular ways.” 84 Immigration control naturalizes the United States as a nation distinct
from others whose border defines both the geographical territory of the nation as well as
the people who rhetorically belong to this territory.

26

Additionally, Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” is particularly relevant in
the rhetorical construction of the nation because it defines immigration control as a
mechanism of “calculations and tactics” used by the state to organize and manage its
domain. 85 The state exercises its power over its domain through the various processes of
immigration control, institutionalizing the unequal relations created by the narrative of
exclusionary nationalism and establishing a “power that insidiously objectifies those on
whom it is applied.” 86 People, then, are objectified by laws that emerge from unequal
conditions, rendering them intelligible, calculable, and manageable while regulating their
movements in order to preserve political sovereignty. In this chapter I argue immigration
control is the primary technology that gives the narrative of exclusionary nationalism the
power to determine which people are excluded from entering the country and,
consequently, excluded from participating in the national narrative.
The following section investigates the racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses
contrived by White policymakers about nineteenth century Asian migration, and how
these discourses became institutionalized through policy. Drawing from presidential and
congressional testimony about Asian migration, I demonstrate how exclusionary
nationalist discourses of Yellow Peril were legitimized through the implementation of the
Chinese Exclusion Act. Moreover, I claim the White state’s targeting of the Asian
immigrants for exclusion constituted the immigrant body as a racialized, rhetorical
symbol over which the state could assert its control. Finally, I examine the rhetorical
consequences of Asian exclusion on the racialization of the United States’ territorial
border.
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The Institutionalization of Yellow Peril and the
Racialization of the Border through 1900
As immigration into the United States grew throughout the nineteenth century, the
privileged position of Anglo-Saxons became increasingly threatened, igniting the spread
of exclusionary nationalist narratives throughout the White nation and influencing the
implementation of restrictive immigration policies. Following the end of the American
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution sparked a mass migration to the burgeoning
industries in the United States. 87 The majority of the country saw migration from
Western European and Scandinavian countries, nationalities deemed assimilable into the
American national narrative; however, the migration patterns along the West Coast were
not as well received by the White nation when Chinese immigrants boarded boats by the
tens of thousands to find work in the U.S. railroad industry. 88 Even though low wage jobs
were plentiful, many West Coast residents feared that the Chinese immigrants would
depress wages and provoke unfair job competition.
On the surface, classist rhetoric of economic recourse legitimized anti-Chinese
sentiment; however, racism and xenophobia were the driving forces behind the
campaigns to restrict Chinese immigration. The Chinese were accused by policymakers
of having “low morals, specifically of practicing prostitution and smoking opium; of low
health standards; and of corrupt influences and practices.” 89 These exclusionary
nationalist discourses of “Yellow Peril” were motivated by xenophobic fear of the ethnic
“Other.” 90 Foucault argues fear should be viewed not as an object, but as a “discursive
practice” that becomes a “meaningful object of knowledge” used to “master and control”
perceived “disorder.” 91 Chinese migration to the West Coast was viewed by Whites as a
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“disorder” requiring the “master and control” of the state; therefore, policymakers
strategically conjured public fear of Asian immigrants by constituting these immigrants
as dangers to American society, the economy, and its people.
Discourses of Yellow Peril exemplified the xenophobic narratives characterizing
Chinese immigrants as “demoralizing and degrading” to the nation, thereby legitimizing
their discipline by the state through mechanisms of immigration control. 92 For example,
in a report submitted to Congress by the Committee on Education and Labor on April 12,
1882, President James A. Garfield utilized discourses of fear to sway policymakers to
control their migration. He argued that the Yellow Peril narratives about the Chinese
were premised upon “undisputed and indisputable facts” and he justified the
characterization of the Chinese by remarking,
That they come to this country without families. . . . and without the intention to
make it their permanent residence; that they are packed together like sardines in a
box . . . that they retain their distinctive peculiarities and characteristics, refusing
to assimilate themselves to our institutions, and remaining a separate and distinct
class, entrenched behind immovable prejudices; that their ignorance or disregard
of sanitary laws, as evidenced in their habits of life, breeds disease, pestilence,
and death; that their claim of superiority as to religion and civilization destroys all
hope of their improvement from contact with our institutions; these are the known
and undenied facts in the problem of Chinese immigration. 93
The fear-based rhetoric in Garfield’s remarks address the classist concerns White citizens
had regarding the transitory Chinese laborers. White workers believed temporary Chinese
workers would lower competitive wages because they didn’t have families to feed or
houses to maintain; therefore, they urged policymakers to control their negative economic
influence by stopping immigration from China. Garfield criticized Chinese immigrants
for their lower class living standards, suggesting they were altogether a sub-class of
human beings deserving of the state’s discipline.
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In addition to expressing classist concerns, President Garfield used raciallycharged metaphors to compare the immigrants to “sardines,” suggesting they were
animals who “[bred] disease, pestilence, and death.” Philosopher James Collins Ross
claims that “bodily metaphors presented convenient tropes for representing certain
immigrants as threats and enacting policies to control them.” 94 In the case of
immigration, metaphors create difference between the immigrant body and the
Anglicized American body, justifying their exclusion from the American identity through
policy. Metaphors also allow the rhetorical imagination to run wild with exaggerated
images of immigrants “breeding” like animals, creating fear among the White nation that
if immigration is left uncontrolled, it will become an unnatural pandemic infecting
American society with its “Otherness.” Thus, by reducing the Chinese immigrant to a
sub-human status, xenophobic discourses of Yellow Peril both justified and created a
social necessity for Congress to control their immigration into the United States, resulting
in the passage of the country’s first legislation restricting an entire population based on
race and national origin known as the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. 95
The Chinese Exclusion Act contributed to the narrative of exclusionary
nationalism by legitimizing the classist, racist, and xenophobic discourses of Yellow Peril
while transforming the U.S. borders into sites of control over immigration, race,
citizenship, policy, and international relations. By formally stating “the coming of
Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities,” the
Chinese Exclusion Act reinforced the popular claims that the immigrants were taking
over the Pacific Coast and needed to be controlled by law. 96 The Act also established
“selective immigration” as a primary mechanism for controlling immigrants. 97 Foucault
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argues that greater state power is often achieved through the act of defining and
prohibiting abnormalities. 98 By establishing a legal process by which Chinese
immigration was prohibited, the state augmented its power over the non-White immigrant
body, defining it as deviant and altogether excluding it from the American national
narrative.
Legally excluding a group of immigrants from entering the United States creates
the possibility for illegal entry, establishing the narrative identity of “undocumented”
while moving the sight of immigration control to the territorial borders and introducing
mechanisms of border security to the narrative of exclusionary nationalism. 99 The
Chinese Exclusion Act made illegal entry a criminal offense and required that “any
Chinese person found unlawfully within the United States shall be caused to be removed
there from to the country from whence he came.” 100 The threat posed by the illegal entry
of Chinese immigrants sparked narratives of discipline and control and initiated the
securitization of the border. 101 In Congressional testimony given by Washington state
Senator W.R. Forrest in 1891 on the topic of illegal Chinese entries, he stated, “There are
a great many coming in [defiance of the law]. . . . I have no means of placing any
estimate on that; but the frontier is so unguarded that they may be coming in squads . . .
there must be many who are coming in and not discovered . . . it is almost impossible to
identify them.” 102 Other policymakers shared Forrest’s uncertainty as to how many
Chinese immigrants were illegally entering the United States, claiming the “Chinaman”
was “shrewd and cunning,” resorting to “all practices,” legal and illegal, “to obtain
admission to the country;” therefore, these policymakers advocated for “strict
enforcement” of the Chinese Exclusion Act to ensure the “pest-breeding” Chinese race
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did not have a “decidedly demoralizing effect on . . . citizens.” 103 Policymakers believed
illegal Chinese immigration threatened the so-called safety of the state and, more
specifically, their privileged position of power.
Congress believed the inability to manage the movement of populations across the
territorial border placed the White state in a precarious position incapable of ensuring
sovereignty over the nation. To maintain power, Foucault argues that the government
must ensure the “safety of the territory, or the safety of the sovereign who rules over the
territory.” 104 He offers a model by which government ensures this security: the triangle of
“sovereignty—discipline—government, which has its primary target the population and
its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security.” 105 In the case of immigrants
crossing illegally in the United States, the government perceives them as an untraceable
and incalculable population; therefore, they are outside of the surveillance and discipline
of the state and, thus, perceived as potential threats to the nation’s sovereignty. In an
attempt to control the illegal immigration of Chinese along the Mexico border, the federal
government enacted narratives of control through policing efforts such as surveillance,
patrols, apprehensions, and deportation of illegal Chinese immigrants. 106 These
mechanisms of policing the immigrant body symbolized the discursive gaze of the
Anglicized national narrative over delinquent illegal border crossers, projecting the
power of the national narrative onto the powerless Chinese immigrant for the purpose of
maintaining existing power relations. 107 Though many Chinese immigrants successfully
challenged these mechanisms through tactics of resistance, such as using fraudulent
documents to enter illegally, the objectification of the immigrant body through the
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securitization of the border established immigration control as a primary technology
through which government would retain its power over the national narrative.
The primary consequence of the Chinese Exclusion Act was the
institutionalization of White nationalism and its constitution of racialized understandings
of “the illegal immigrant problem.” 108 Erica Lee explains illegal immigration from other
nationalities was overwhelmingly ignored, making Chinese border crossers the public
image of the illegal immigrant and reinforcing the popular discourses of Yellow Peril that
had initially led to the creation of the Chinese Exclusion Act. 109 This racialization did not
occur to the same extent among Mexican and European immigrants. Mexican immigrants
were seen as seasonal migrants who filled critical economic need and posed no long-term
threat to the national narrative, while European immigrants who most closely resembled
the Anglo-Saxon identity were establishing permanent settlements; therefore, these
groups were “implicitly constructed as white” upon entry, generally avoiding the
difficulties experienced by the Chinese. 110 By focusing border patrol efforts on
immigrants excluded by the Chinese Exclusion Act, the discourses of Yellow Peril were
legally legitimized and the nation’s first illegal immigrant became racialized as Chinese.
Thus, the turn of the twentieth century marked the era when selective immigration and
border control became the primary mechanisms for racializing the narrative of
exclusionary nationalism, setting the precedence for future exclusions of undesirable
peoples from the White national narrative based on their race alone.
The Chinese Exclusion Act succeeded only temporarily in “protecting” the
American national narrative from perceived racial and economic threats, and as
heterogeneous immigration to the United States increased over the next several decades,
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policymakers contrived new mechanisms of control such as illiteracy tests and health
inspections to legitimize the exclusion of non-White “Others.” Grounded in nineteenth
century assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses of exclusionary
nationalism, the implementation of illiteracy tests and health inspections perpetuated the
established dominance of the White national narrative into the twentieth century. The
following section investigates the rise of the twentieth century nativist movement and the
influence of its exclusionary nationalist narratives on selective immigration control.
Rhetorical Threats of New Immigration: A Renewed Focus on Assimilation and the
Rise of Biological Control through 1917
A resurgence of exclusionary nationalist discourses rooted in classism and racism
took place in Congress at the turn of the twentieth century as policymakers felt threatened
by a “new” wave of immigrants motivated by short-term economic gain rather than
permanent settlement. These discourses focused on the assimilation of “new” immigrants
because these they varied in ethnic background and immigrant intent from the “old”
immigrants, causing policymakers concern over the stability of the Anglo-Saxon national
narrative that, up until this point, had been seemingly well-preserved through selective
immigration policy. In its 1911 report to Congress, the Immigration Commission
described the difference between “new” and “old” immigration, stating, “The old
immigration movement was essentially one of permanent settlers. The new immigration
is very largely one of individuals. . . . coming to America to temporarily take advantage
of the greater wages paid for Industrial labor.” 111 The majority of “new” immigrants
came from impoverished southern and eastern European and Asian countries, where
“their highest wage [was] small compared with the lowest wage in the United States.” 112
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Because of their lower economic status, many of these new immigrants were chastised by
policymakers for being “unskilled” and “illiterate” economic burdens, constituting
“widespread feeling of apprehension as to the effect on the economic and social welfare
of the country.” 113 Policymakers discriminated against poor immigrants for fear their
presence would lower the living standards for all Americans, creating an explicit
hierarchy where citizens’ concerns were prioritized over immigrants and establishing
classism as a hallmark discourse of exclusionary nationalism.
Discourses of class in the narrative of exclusionary nationalism were inherently
linked to those of assimilationism and racism surrounding the African American
dilemma, stirring anxieties about European and Asiatic immigrants alike. In a 1910 report
by the Immigration Commission, Prescott F. Hall of the Immigration Restriction League
expressed popular nativist discourses comparing the “new” wave of immigrants to
African Americans when he stated,
While there are doubtless no races in Europe or Asia as unassimilable with [the
Anglo- Saxon] race as the negroes are, yet in many cases it is only the difference
in degree, and unless some check is put upon the unrestricted outpouring upon us
of these individual degenerates and members of unassimilable races I believe that
posterity will rise up to curse us for our folly or neglect. 114
Hall’s statement held fast to assimilationist and racist discourses of exclusionary
nationalism when he claimed the Anglo-Saxon race was superior to all others and that all
other races must assimilate into this dominant national narrative of White supremacy.
Reflecting the narratives of the Founding Fathers, Hall and other nativists called upon
Congress to check unrestricted immigration in order to ensure the Anglo-Saxon narrative
maintained its dominance as the national narrative. In response to nativists’ demands,
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Congress passed the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone Act and targeted the exclusion of poor,
“unassimilable” immigrants. 115
Influenced by exclusionary nationalist discourses of classism, assimilationism,
and racism, the Asiatic Barred Zone Act institutionalized a new mechanism of control
with the creation of literacy requirements. Like the Founding Fathers, twentieth century
restrictivists viewed literacy as “an index of Americanization” and the key to proper
assimilation into the American ideal. 116 The English language was a symbol of
Americanism and created rhetorical simultaneity in the imagined national community;
therefore, those desiring to be American were required to have an aptitude towards
speaking its symbolic language. 117 English-speaking policymakers feared that the
thousands of laborers belonging to the “new” wave of immigration would remain isolated
from American culture because they lived in boarding houses with one another and had
little incentive or necessity to learn the “sacred” English language. Policymakers believed
these isolated foreign workers undermined the centrality of the English language in the
American national ideal and weakened Anglo-Saxon (White) political power.
In addition to assimiliationism, the attitudes of policymakers towards the “new”
wave of immigrant laborers were also rooted in classism. They believed the “new”
immigrants represented the “poorest and most illiterate” from their “stricken countries,”
and would “erect the lowest standard of living” by “[flocking] to [the United States] and
[beating] down the price of labor.” 118 Eight of the nine members of the Commission on
Immigration and Naturalization believed “illiteracy tests” were the “the most feasible
single method of restricting undesirable immigration” by increasing the probability that
assimilable “good citizens” will enter. 119 Majority members of Congress insisted that
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instituting literacy requirements would improve the quality and ability of immigrants to
assimilate into American social and political culture as well as minimize their perceived
threat to the higher standard of living enjoyed by most White Americans. In order to
“prevent the hardships and other evils” that result from the immigration of unwanted
immigrants, Congress instituted a $100 dollar fine for bringing in “defective aliens” who
fail the illiteracy tests. 120 Such restrictions excluded uneducated immigrants from lower
economic statuses, encouraging American prosperity by reducing the immigration of
potential economic and cultural burdens. As a result, the 1917 illiteracy tests became a
permanent measure of assimilability into the Anglo-Saxon political and social body,
institutionalizing assimilationist, racist, and classist discourses as acceptable mechanisms
of control over the poor and illiterate immigrant body.
Another consequence of the Asiatic Barred Zone Act was the institutionalization
of racism through the biological exclusion of undesirable immigrants. Along with
discourses of assimilation and class, popular discourses of health rooted in racism grew in
popularity after World War I as the United States government focused on public health as
a means to strengthen the nation. 121 In an attempt to recover national health, Congress
expanded immigrant exclusions based on undesirable biological attributes in the 1917
Act, adding a subcategory for medical exclusions based on “general conditions,” meaning
any disease or physical abnormality that did not fit into one of the two conditions
outlined in a previous 1903 law. 122 The Act continued the bar on all “idiots, imbeciles,
feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons. . . . Persons of constitutional
psychopathic inferiority. . . . Persons afflicted with tuberculosis in any form or with a
loathsome or dangerous contagious disease,” reinforcing the inclusion of only able-
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bodied immigrants in the national narrative. 123 These exclusions were inherently racist as
many of the undesirable traits were ascribed to select nationalities. According to
Foucault, most “biological threats” are racialized by those holding the position of power
who construct these threats as being created by the “other race, the subrace, the
counterrace.” 124 For example, polio was labeled an Italian disease because most of the
afflicted immigrants happened to arrive from Italy; therefore, the exclusion of non-White
Italians was justified by this racialized medical stereotype. 125 Thus, race became a
primary indicator of an immigrant’s biological health.
In addition being influenced by racism, biological exclusion was entrenched in
classism because Congress feared the United States would “become an asylum for an
increasing number of those unable to sustain themselves.” 126 Immigrant bodies were
viewed as economic commodities, and only those who would benefit the economy were
allowed to enter. Foucault describes this practice of “bio-politics” as an “indispensible
element in the development of capitalism” through which policymakers regulate
capitalistic opportunity through the biological control of the population. 127 Those
immigrants unable to contribute to economic growth are deemed a burden to the state,
requiring control in order to ensure the success of capitalist undertakings. The
understanding that diseased or disabled immigrant “Others” posed a threat to both the
racial homogeneity and economic prosperity of the nation was further normalized
through the “medical [policing]” at the border when the Bureau of Immigration put in
place the country’s first twenty-four hour immigrant inspection stations. 128 The physical
examination of the immigrant body at these stations served as a bio-political “means of
control and a method of domination” that, as theorized by Foucault, established relations
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of power that normalized the immigrant as an “effect and object of [the government’s]
power.” 129 By reducing the immigrant to a racialized, diseased object, the government
legitimized the exclusion of culturally and economically threatening immigrants under
the auspices of protecting the health of the nation.
The exclusive apparatuses of immigration control instituted in the 1917 Act
constructed the territorial border a primary site for the maintenance of White power over
the non-White immigrant body. Consequently, border patrol agents and health inspectors
became narrators of exclusionary nationalism through the administration of tests and
biological inspections. By enacting assimilationist, racist, and classist discourses of
exclusionary nationalism, they reinforced the powerless position of the non-White
immigrant body and upheld the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon American identity.
Maintaining White/non-White power relations through the biological control of the
immigrant became of heightened concerning the next decade as narratives of nativism,
biological superiority, and scientific legitimacy collided during the rise of the eugenics
movement. The following section examines the continuing influence of racist,
xenophobic, and classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism exhibited during the
1920’s and their impact on new forms of selective immigration control.
The Narratives of Eugenics: Science, Race, and Xenophobia
during the Tribal Twenties
The relationships between race, biology, and exclusionary nationalism became
more intimately intertwined during the 1920’s as the biological control of immigration
served as the primary mechanism for promoting exclusionary nationalism. Prewar trends
of ethnocentrism and xenophobia found renewed fervor in the “tribal era” of the 1920’s
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when a society hungry for American unity attempted to regain confidence after a period
of wartime disillusionment. 130 Historian John Higham argues the war had simply
suspended prewar animosities towards Catholics, Jews, Asians, and southeastern
Europeans, and that increased immigration, the onset of depression, and a wave of crime
associated with prohibition cultivated an environment ripe for nativism. 131 In this era of
nativism, self-named patriots insisted upon the “Americanization” of all immigrants
already within the country’s borders and rejected the influx of newcomers. 132
Nativist groups like the Ku Klux Klan gained social prominence during the
1920’s by capitalizing on the popular discourses of nativism and Americanization. 133
Their racist credo was anti-Catholic, anti-African American, and anti-immigrant,
targeting African Americans and immigrants from eastern and southern Europe for
exclusion because of their perceived threat to the White, Anglo-Saxonized American
identity. The Klan claimed eastern and southern Europeans, many of whom practiced
Catholicism, should be barred from entering the United States to protect the cultural and
political dominance of “old-stock Americans” descending from the “Nordic Race” from
the “sinister” immigrants threatening the expansion of “modern civilization.” 134 The
conservative discourse of the Klan symbolized the popular belief that the national turmoil
experienced during WWI should result in a “purified, regenerate society,” and any barrier
to this rebirth of Anglo-Saxon ideals should be eliminated. 135 These racist and
xenophobic discourses affirmed cultural homogeneity as a pillar of national strength,
reinforcing the American national narrative as an Anglo-Saxon one.
The rhetorical system of eugenics gained momentum during the 1920’s when
nativist groups built on ideologies of racism and xenophobia flourished in the United
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States. In “Heredity in Relation to Eugenics,” eugenicist Charles Davenport defines
eugenics as “the science of the improvement of the human race by better breeding.” 136
Eugenicists argued hereditary factors, rather than environmental factors, produced
unalterable human inequalities. The emphasis on science as a mechanism to measure the
strength of the human race represented the rising of “scientific race-thinking,” a
rhetorical movement in which scientific experts were funded by the government to
provide a so-called “objective” lens by which to view differences of race. 137 This
“objective” lens legitimized popular notions of White supremacy by scientifically
proving the inferiority of non-Whites, greatly influencing twentieth century notions of
nationalism. Eugenicists argued for a White nationalism based on the “fundamental fact
that all men are created bound by their protoplasmic makeup and unequal in their powers
and responsibilities.” 138 They used this so-called science to prove the superiority of
Anglo-Saxons over all other races, describing Anglos as having “the most active,
ambitious and courageous blood . . . the crème de la crème” in comparison to the “weaker
minds” of other races. 139
Foucault’s concept of state racism is particularly useful when analyzing how
science institutionalizes racial supremacy. He argues that the discourse of race is used to
preserve the sovereignty of the state through “medico-normalizing techniques” that link
cultural norms to biology. 140 Furthermore, Foucault argues that the discourse of race is a
“battle” waged by the “race that holds the power and is entitled to define the norm” and
against those who fall outside this norm and “pose a threat to the biological
heritage.” 141 As such, the eugenics movement furthered the notion that the American
norm was a pure (White) Anglo-Saxon one, establishing racism as a primary discourse of
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exclusionary nationalism used to protect the sovereignty of the nation. As part of this
process, eugenicists institutionalized a “biological-type caesura” in which the state could
“[subdivide] the species it [controlled]” into racialized “subspecies” of which all nonWhite subspecies were biologically inferior to the great Anglicized White subspecies. 142
Such pseudo-scientific discourses were positioned as objective, irrefutable claims that
Whites were racially superior and, thus, qualified to construct the dominant national
narrative.
The scientific legitimization of White racial superiority through the rhetorical
system of eugenics constituted the narrative of an “American Race,” and the main
narrators were policymakers of Anglo-Saxon decent. Using the rhetorical strategies
invented by the Founding Fathers and applying them to the new “expert” pseudo-science
of race, these policymakers utilized the science of eugenics to rationalize their top
hierarchical position in the making of the “American Race,” establishing their narrative
both authentic and believable. Rhetorician Walter R. Fisher explains the importance of
creating rational narratives for the purpose of influencing audiences. He notes,
“Rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings—their inherent
awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story, and their constant
habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether or not the stories they experience ring true with
the stories they know to be true in their lives.” 143 A narrative that lacks both probability
and fidelity fails in its ability to influence its audience; therefore, to make the story of the
“American Race” influential, policymakers drew on the conclusions of eugenicists to
both create a coherent American narrative as well as establish this narrative as true.
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Eugenicists claimed Americans from British descent were scientifically “proven”
to be the “strongest” and “most fit” of all Americans; therefore, they were qualified to
construct the narrative of the American race. 144 Harry Laughlin, Director of the Eugenics
Record Office and member of the Committee on Eugenic Legislation, outlined the racial
hierarchies constituting the “American Race” at a Congressional conference on
immigration restriction in 1924. He argued,
If the American race is composed, first, of descendants of immigrants of the
British Isles; then immigrants coming from Germany, Scandinavia, from the
Netherlands, from France, then the Jewish group, then from Spain, then, possibly,
Hungary, Russia, and the group from other countries, if that is the stuff out of
which the American race is made, and if we maintain those proportions, I think
we would make a great step in advance. 145
Laughlin’s narrative of the “American Race” was similar to the early twentieth century
assimilationists’ call for the Americanization of all immigrants; however, it differed in
that certain races were deemed forever inassimilable based on their “genetic makeup.”
His so-called science found Anglo-Saxons to be genetically superior to all others, giving
them permanent authority over the rhetorical construction of the American race and
taking nativist discourses to a new level of exclusionary physiognomy. This “scientific”
construction of the “American Race” constituted a renewed White nationalism that
targeted all racial “Others” for exclusion. 146 The immigration question in the 1920’s
wasn’t whether or not there would be new restrictions, but rather what form would these
restrictions would take. Policymakers feared an “immigrant invasion” of non-AngloSaxon immigrants and negotiated a new form of selective immigration control in order to
protect the national narrative of the Anglo-Saxon American: the quota system. 147
The passage of the National Origins Law in 1921, also known as the Emergency
Quota Act, marked the moment in U.S. history when immigration policy established a
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system of preferences through which quotas could be allocated. These quotas were based
on the “national origin” of immigrants, a category conceptualized by the Quota Board in
an attempt to classify immigrants based on their ethnic background. 148 Foucault refers to
such categorizations as “technical inventions” enacted in order to construct “a body of
knowledge about these individuals,” reducing their power while reinforcing the power of
the institution. 149 By classifying immigrants based on their national origin, policymakers
reduced immigrant bodies to whether or not their country of origin made them eligible for
assimilation into the “American Race.” 150 The Quota Act institutionalized this
reductionism and, according to eugenicist Henry Laughlin, developed a “practical method
by which the United States could regulate immigration by nationalities, roughly in
proportion to assimilability.” 151 As a result, assimiliationist, racist, and xenophobic
discourses of exclusionary nationalism backed by so-called science constructed formal
categories of exclusion and upheld the dominance of the Anglicized national narrative for
decades to come.
Intended only as a temporary act, the Quota Act was extended twice as
restrictivist discourses dominated the legislature. President Calvin Coolidge exemplified
this restrictive rhetoric during his 1923 message to Congress, arguing American cultural
life was predicated upon knowledge and fidelity to self-government and principles of
good citizenship. He asserted, “New arrivals should be limited to our capacity to absorb
them into the ranks of good citizenship. America must be kept American. For this
purpose, it is necessary to continue a policy of restricted immigration.” 152 Coolidge
emphasized assimilation as the main goal of eugenics-inspired restrictive immigration.
His statement “America must be kept American” echoed the popular nativist discourses
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embraced by the White descendents of Anglo-Saxons who feared increasing immigration
would endanger their cultural dominance. Supported by the science of eugenics and
institutionalized within the categorization of national origins, these popular discourses of
assimilationism and racism supported the narrative fidelity of exclusionary nationalism
and provided the context for the future passage of an even more restrictive and permanent
quota system in the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924.
The influence of assimilationist, racist, and xenophobic discourses in the
rhetorical construction of the “American Race” as well as the political popularity of the
1921 National Origins Act culminated in the passage of one of the most restrictive
immigration policies to date, the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924. 153 Commonly referred to as
the National Origins Act, the Johnson-Reed Act was a direct consequence of
exclusionary nationalist fears that the greatest migration in history would begin July 1,
1924, the day after the expiration of 1921 Quota Act. The Johnson-Reed Act stated, “To
endure the United States must have homogeneity of its people. The future depends upon
the children of all who are here. For their welfare restriction of immigration is
necessary.” 154 This belief validated the narrowing of the number of immigrants admitted
under the already restrictive 1921 quota system by allowing only two percent of the
foreign-born population to enter the United States. In a report delivered to the sixtyeighth Congress on February 9, 1924, the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization
called for an “immediate and urgent” enactment of restrictive immigration legislation to
control the immigrants they deemed unable to assimilate:
The naturalization process cannot work well with the continued arrival in large
numbers of the so-called new immigration. The new type crowds the cities. . . . It
gains but slight knowledge of America and American institutions. It has grown to
be the undigested mass of alien thought, alien sympathy, and alien purpose. It is a
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menace to the social, political, and economic life of the country. It creates alarm
and apprehension. It breeds racial hatreds which should not exist in the United
States and which need not exist when the balance shall have been restored. 155
Similar to the Founding Fathers, the committee expressed commonly held concerns
regarding the inability of large numbers of immigrants to assimilate. Using bodily
metaphors, they likened immigrants to an “undigestable” mass of people, blaming
immigrants for “breeding” racial hostility rather than pointing the finger inward at racist
Americans. These xenophobic metaphors mirrored those used in Congressional testimony
over the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, constructing undesirable non-White immigrants
as grotesque beings preventing the healthy functioning of the nation. Just as they did
forty years ago, Congress embraced the committee’s exclusionary nationalist rhetoric and
passed the Johnson-Reed Act with an overwhelming majority. 156
The nativist 1920’s marked the decade in which the narrative of exclusionary
nationalism became intrinsically linked to the White notion of a biologically superior
Anglicized “American Race” and was institutionalized through the implementation of the
national origins quota system. Scientifically “legitimized” assimilationist, racist, and
xenophobic discourses resulted in a restrictive policy that would control the racial
landscape of the United States for decades to come. As a consequence, the quota system
forced all non-White cultural competitors to assimilate into an Anglo-Saxon American
ideal or else risk complete exclusion. In addition, it ensured the dominance of existing
power relations that favored the Anglo-Saxon national narrative over all others.
Furthermore, it justified existing race relations between White and non-White citizens,
preserving the homogenous narrative of White supremacy.
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The systematic exclusion of all non-White immigrants “Others” based on national
origins remained a primary mechanism of exclusionary nationalism throughout the next
several decades; however, the onset of the Great Depression and the coming of World
War II inspired new mechanisms of control to take a more prominent role in maintaining
the Anglo-Saxon national narrative. The following section discusses the development of
internal enforcement in the mid twentieth century, a new mechanism of control used to
reinforce exclusionary nationalism.
Constituting Rhetorical Enemies through Fear: Exclusionary Nationalism and the
Control of Mexican Laborers, Japanese Residents, and Communist Subversives
The 1930’s brought about a shift in the rhetorical construction of the Mexican
border-crosser from friendly neighbor to an enemy of the state. The Great Depression led
to an increased competition for jobs along the American Southwest, igniting antiimmigrant sentiments among White workers who believed immigrant laborers were the
cause of the economic downturn. 157 As a result, Mexican immigrants who were once
constructed as “White” participants in the national narrative were now constituted by
racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses as being national enemies. 158 This rhetorical
shift is documented in congressional testimony.
A 1921 report on foreign relations gave preference to Mexican immigrants,
stating, “All other conditions being equal, the neighbor of a place shall be preferred to
those of a distance.” 159 Just nine years later, these neighborly sentiments were replaced
by classist concerns as demonstrated in a report by the Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization that defined Mexican neighbors as a “different type,” and that “it is the
peon type that has been sucked into the United States in large numbers since 1917.” 160
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Policymakers feared that Mexicans would “in a comparatively short time change the
complexion of the population . . . and bring about a hyphenised, politically unstabilized
[sic], Latinized majority throughout the Southwest.” 161 Whereas policymakers once
welcomed Mexican neighbors, they were now terrified of the influx of lower class
Mexican “peons” with dark complexions and redefined them as racial and economic
enemies of the state. 162 According to rhetorician Maurice Charland, the making of
subjects is “always social, constituted in language,” and this temporal, rhetorical
construction creates an “illusion” of an “unified and unproblematic subjectivity” that is
ahistorical in nature. 163 Thus, the new rhetorical construction of Mexican border-crossers
as national threats in the 1930’s erased any historical evidence of their previous inclusion
in the national narrative.
Just as selective immigration policy had served as a mechanism by which to
legitimize the narrative of exclusionary nationalism, strategies of internal enforcement
furthered the institutionalization of this exclusive narrative while simultaneously
constituting the Mexican immigrant as a national threat. Internal enforcement differed
from selective immigration policy in that it focused its control within the country’s
territorial borders. Whereas selective immigration policy targeted those with the potential
to enter the country, internal enforcement directed disciplinary tactics on subjects already
residing in the United States. In the case of the1930’s labor crisis in the American
Southwest, the government instituted its largest strategy of internal enforcement to date:
the Mexican Repatriation Drive. The Mexican Repatriation Drive was a government
sponsored campaign that encouraged and forcibly removed Mexican immigrants from the
United States in an attempt to lessen the amount of economic competition. Although all
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Mexican immigrants and their descendents were victims of the Mexican Repatriation
drive, those immigrants who had entered the country illegally became the primary targets
of internal enforcement tactics. 164 Such tactics included raids, mass deportations,
inspections, and public arrests; however, it was the tactic of criminalizing the Mexican
immigrant that achieved the most rhetorical prominence. 165
Racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses of fear triggered the Mexican
Repatriation Drive, remaking the Mexican immigrant as inherently criminal to validate
his or her deportation. Historian Tomás Summers Sandoval notes that prior to the 1930’s,
the term “illegal immigrant” was reserved for Asian and southern and eastern European
immigrants who encountered more barriers to legal entries because of their perceived
threat to American cultural homogeneity; however, in the 1930’s a rhetorical shift took
place when White workers felt increasingly threatened by the number of Mexican
laborers entering the United States, and the term “illegal immigrants” expanded to meet
local demographics and concerns of “Mexican overpopulation.” 166 This racial
(re)articulation of the illegal immigrant as being Mexican occurred alongside the growth
of classist fears regarding economic strife and unemployment, resulting in the rhetorical
construction of the Mexican immigrant as inherently “disobedient” and “dangerous” to
the Anglicized national narrative. 167 Although most Mexican immigrants were not
dangerous, Foucault contends that the power in criminalizing subjects lies not in the level
of the subject’s actions or actual violations of the law, but “at the level of the behavioral
potentialities [the criminal] represented.” 168 Simply the potential that a subject could act
criminally is enough to justify that subject’s discipline; therefore, the discipline of the
entire population of Mexican immigrants was validated through their possible
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criminality. Through the act of criminalizing, policymakers made rhetorical connections
between “Mexican” and “criminal” such that all Mexican immigrants, legal and illegal,
were constructed as inherently criminal. Rhetorician Lisa Flores argues the “catch-all
term ‘criminal’ allows the criminal nature of Mexicans to be tapped whenever
rhetorically needed, constituting Mexicans as potentially significant threats.” 169
Discourses of fear, then, became powerful disciplinary techniques that “[reduced] the
[Mexican] body to a ‘political force,’” forever defining it as disobedient to the obedient
White citizen, and consequently, disobedient to the national narrative. 170 Thus, the
internal enforcement of the Mexican Repatriation Drive institutionalized narratives of
fear rooted in racism, xenophobia, and classism while constituting the “problem” of
illegal immigration as a Mexican problem and excluding these “conquered natives” from
the national narrative. 171
Just as policymakers used exclusionary nationalist discourses of fear to exclude
Mexicans in the 1930’s, they constructed Japanese residents as latent threats to the
security of the nation. The 1941 Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii ignited a new wave of Yellow Peril characterized by racist, xenophobic, and
classist discourses that constructed Japanese residents as targets of internal enforcement.
The onset of WWII sparked a resurgence of xenophobic discourses of fear concerned
with safeguarding the “welfare and security” of the nation from the potential “sabotage”
of all non-White Communist “Others,” and Asians became the scapegoats for this
American anxiety. 172 Policymakers capitalized on discourses of fear by alluding to a
potential government take-over by Japanese residents and creating a widespread feeling
of distrust towards the racial group. This suspected disloyalty of Japanese residents
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provides the context for understanding how the mass internment of Japanese immigrants
and citizens alike was achieved through the implementation of Executive Order 9066, an
order made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt mandating the forced evacuation and
internment of over 120,000 Japanese residents into military internment camps across the
United States until the war ended. 173
The racial targeting of Japanese residents by E.O. 9066 mirrored the same
strategy of criminalization under the guise of national security previously used against
Mexican laborers. In the order, Roosevelt stated,
Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection
against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense . . . therefore . . . I
hereby authorize . . . the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from
which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of
any person to enter, remain in, or leave. 174
Roosevelt gave the U.S. military complete control over the allocation and management of
all military areas, thereby approving the removal of Japanese residents from West Coast
communities for the purpose of “protection against espionage and against sabotage.” This
order constituted Japanese residents as potential traitors, calling their loyalty to the state
into question to justify their discipline. Furthermore, the Select Committee Investigating
National Defense Migration validated the internment of all Japanese residents, including
citizens, by stating, “Loyalty is a characteristic that cannot be measured with a yardstick,
and between the obviously loyal and obviously disloyal will fall many cases lacking
positive evidence one way or the other.” 175 The inability to measure loyalty constituted
suspicion in the minds of policymakers; therefore, Congress faced little opposition when
they called for the elimination of “all elements dangerous to the security and well-being
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of the Nation,” even though innocent people would inevitably be marked with the “badge
of the traitor.” 176
The discourses of loyalty used to justify E.O. 9066 and uphold the dominance of
the exclusionary nationalism were inherently racist. Though Germany and Italy were also
enemies of the war, residents of German and Italian heritage were not subject to the
internment Japanese residents faced because the physical racial features that had been
used in exclusionary discourse to proclaim the inferiority of Asian peoples could readily
identify Japanese. Policymakers targeted only those Germans and Italians suspected of
having connections to the war, arresting and trying the offenders individually. On the
other hand, in the same way the state targeted all persons of Mexican heritage (including
U.S. citizens) for deportation in the 1930’s, Japanese residents were disciplined as a
racial mass whether or not they had been involved in suspicious activities. Earl Warren,
the attorney general of California, explained this difference in treatment, “We believe that
when we are dealing with the Caucasian race we have methods that will test the loyalty of
them. . . . But when we deal with the Japanese we are in an entirely different field and
cannot form any opinion that we believe to be sound.” 177 Warren’s remarks represented
policymakers’ racist constructions of Germans and Italians as White, sanctioning their
more liberal treatment over the Japanese non-White “Others.” By making a rhetorical
connection between national loyalty and race, policymakers supported the exclusion of
racial “Others” from participation in the national narrative and justified their control by
the state. Thus, the internment of thousands of Japanese residents during WWII
exemplified the racist discourses of exclusionary nationalism, confirming the xenophobic
narratives of Yellow Peril as rhetorical strategies for creating policy.
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In addition to justifying the internment of thousands of Japanese residents during
WWII, racialized discourses of national loyalty legitimized rhetorical strategies of
assimilation and constituted Japanese bodies as powerless sites of government control.
Foucault argues that wartime politics focus on reinscribing “the relationship of force” of
the dominant nation within “institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the
bodies of individuals.” 178 In the case of the United States during WWII, the government
administered this relationship of force through the creation of the War Relocation
Authority (WRA), a civilian agency under the Department of the Interior charged with
the “mass social engineering” of loyal Japanese residents through strategic
“rehabilitative” activities of assimilation. 179 These activities included classes, seminars,
trainings, recreational activities, and required labor duties that were meant to encourage
an understanding of American democratic self-government, education, and employment
as well as to instill a sense of loyalty to the American nation. To justify these practices of
racial and national “rehabilitation,” the WRA infantilized Japanese residents, calling
them “racial children in need of democratic tutelage” in order to fully assimilate into
mainstream society upon their release. 180 These racist discourses reinforced the dominant
position of the paternal White state over the subordinate, non-White Japanese resident,
making the Japanese body a rhetorical pawn in the enforcement of power relations and
the maintenance of exclusionary nationalism. 181
The emphasis on the rhetorical relationship between national loyalty and
assimilation continued into the next decade as the onset of the Cold War brought with it a
renewed fear of the political “Other.” Previous xenophobic discourses constituting
rhetorical enemies in both Mexican and Japanese residents reinforced the discursive
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strategy of “Othering” all populations considered threatening to the Anglicized national
narrative, including those deemed to be ideological enemies of the state. 182 This
rhetorical strategy was widely during the 1950’s when the United States government
sought to create rhetorical enemies out of Communists who supported an ideology
deemed menacing to Anglo-Saxon democratic values. In an effort to control the influence
of Communism, democrat Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada began an extensive review of
immigration policies to ensure the continued exclusion of “aliens who would seek to
overthrow [the] present government by force or violence.” 183 This two and a half year
investigation was driven by racist and xenophobic discourses of fear that “Othered”
suspected Communists under the guise of national security, resulting in the reinforcement
of the Anglo-Saxon privileged position as the narrator of American nationalism through
the passage of the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952. 184
Senator McCarran capitalized on the widespread fear of Communist subversives
to justify the maintenance of the racist system of quotas based on national origins through
the passage of the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952. Through exclusionary nationalist
discourses, McCarran moved forward his agenda of continuing selective immigration
policies by playing on the deeply held fears policymakers held against Communism. He
claimed the bill would “weed out subversives and other undesirables,” protecting the
democratic nation against Communist takeover. 185 He argued that unrestricted
immigration was a threat to national security and that immigrants were a “stream of
humanity [flowing] into the fabric of our society” that, if “polluted” with Communist
ideals, would have the potential to “infect” American institutions and way of life. 186
Mirroring turn of the century nativist discourses of Yellow Peril and eugenics,
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McCarran’s use of bodily metaphors likened Communist immigrants to diseases that, if
left untreated, would contaminate the cultural homogeneity of the American national
identity and threaten the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism.
McCarran’s subcommittee reinforced the institutional dominance of exclusionary
nationalism by promoting the current system of national origins quotas. When testifying
before Congress, they were careful not to point to the fact that the original 1924 national
origins system was rooted in notions of Nordic supremacy because the concept of racial
hierarchies was now considered faux pas among many policymakers; therefore,
McCarran’s committee reverted to the “objectivity” of the quotas, claiming the national
origins system “provided a fixed and easily determinable method for controlling
immigration which is not subject to the whims and caprice of administrative
interpretation.” 187 Although McCarran was strategic to avoid any racialized arguments
for the Act, his true intentions were revealed when he was asked whether or not unused
quotas should be reallocated to countries under-utilizing their quotas such as southern and
eastern Europe. McCarran responded, “If we scrap the national origins formula, we will,
in the course of a generation or so, change the ethnic and cultural composition of this
Nation.” 188 McCarran’s reply emulated 1920’s nativist discourses focused on protecting
the Anglo-Saxon position of privilege, and despite opposition from anti-restrictionists
McCarran’s subcommittee kept the national origins quota system intact in the 1952
Act. 189 This preservation of the national origins quota system in the first major review of
U.S. immigration policy since the turn of the century upheld assimilationist, racist,
xenophobic, and classist discourses as strategies for policy making, promoting the
narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism. 190
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The rhetorical process of “Othering” within the narrative of exclusionary
nationalism continued as policymakers expanded the relief given to refugees fleeing
Communist persecution through refugee policies that embodied nativist agendas of
maintaining White power. In a letter to Senate president Richard M. Nixon, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower called for emergency legislation aiding refugees who had “braved
death to escape from behind the Iron Curtain . . . searching desperately for freedom [and
looking] to the free world for haven.” 191 Just as the Founding Fathers favored the AngloSaxon national narrative over all others, Eisenhower rhetorically privileged the United
States as a “haven” for those escaping Communism. The Senate responded to
Eisenhower’s request by passing the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, the Refugee-Escape
Act of 1957, and the Fair Share Refugee Relief Act of 1960, all of which validated the
United States’ claims about the “evils of Communism” and the “desirability of
capitalism” by favoring those fleeing from Communist countries. 192 In fact, the RefugeeEscape Act of 1957 highlighted this bias by defining refugees as “victims of racial,
religious, or political persecution fleeing Communist or Communist-occupied or dominated countries, or a country in the Middle East.” 193 These policies strengthened the
binary of power relations between the White “free world” and the non-White Communist
oppressed, and since power is only understood within the context of opposition, the
passage of the refugee relief acts granted the American national narrative rhetorical
dominance as a consequence of the other nations’ weaknesses.194 The implementation of
these refugee acts upheld the culturally and economically informed image of the United
States as enlightened and progressive in comparison to the immigrant’s oppressive home
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country, thereby reinforcing the dominance of exclusionary nationalism through the
marginalizing the non-White immigrant “Other.” 195
Policymakers from the 1930’s to the 1950’s reinforced the assimilationist, racist,
xenophobic, and classist discourses of the 1920’s by instituting new mechanisms of
internal enforcement as well as extending the use of the national origins quota system to
restrict immigration. They legitimized these policies by “Othering” undesirable
immigrants as rhetorical enemies of the state, justifying their discipline under the
auspices of protecting the American national narrative. The consequences of juxtaposing
obedient White democratic American and disobedient non-White immigrant “Other”
validated selective immigration and internal enforcement as the primary mechanisms by
which to promote exclusionary nationalism. Furthermore, it inscribed a permanent
inferior status for the immigrant “Other” within the rhetorical system of national power
relations. This pattern of exclusivity continued over the next several decades as concerns
regarding illegal immigration into the United States increased, pressuring the state to
regain control of its territorial borders. The following section investigates late twentieth
century rhetorical shift towards controlling undocumented immigration via exclusionary
nationalist narratives of surveillance.
Constructing Undocumented Immigrants as “Marked Populations”: Border
Control, Tracking, and Surveillance from 1980-1990
During the last half of the twentieth century, classist narratives of exclusionary
nationalism collided with a renewed focus on national security as policymakers focused
on securing the “porous” territorial borders and taking control of the “problem” of illegal
immigration. 196 The quotas of the 1950’s failed to meet the needs of Latin American
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immigration, and thousands of immigrants determined to pursue economic opportunity in
the United States were unable to obtain legal documents due to restrictive quotas;
therefore, they were left no choice but to cross the border illegally if they wanted to work
in the United States. 197 This pattern of illegal immigration steadily increased over the
next several decades, contributing to heightened classist anxieties during the economic
decline of the 1970’s and sparking a reaction among anti-immigrant activists to stop the
immigrant “invasion.” 198 A 1974 report submitted by the Committee on Government
Operations warned against failing to control “the massive infusion of illegal aliens”
because they would inevitably “displace Americans from jobs” and “place heavy burdens
on . . . education, welfare, and health services,” ultimately jeopardizing the strength of the
nation. 199
These classist discourses continued in 1976 when the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) commissioner Leonard Chapman spoke of the “vast and
silent invasion of illegal immigrants” that threatened the working class. 200 Rhetorical
scholar Otto Santa Ana argues the invasion metaphor is part of the domain of war and
likens the subject to an “organized attack by armed forces with the objective of taking
over a region or country.” 201 Influenced by the ending of the Cold War, policymakers
redirected former security narratives focused on protecting the nation from a Communist
take-over to classist narratives constituting illegal immigration as an aggressive,
organized campaign “invading” working class America. 202 Just as Mexican immigrants
were targets of classist discourses during the 1930’s Mexican Repatriation Drive,
immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border illegally over fifty years later were
constructed as threats to national security and stability.
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To stop the “invasion” of undocumented immigrants, policymakers in the 1980’s
and 1990’s used xenophobic and classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism to define
these untraceable immigrants as a “security problem” and to justify the increase of state
control over the territorial border. 203 Political scholar Ronnie D. Lipschultz argues
“security . . . is meaningless without an ‘other’ to help specify the conditions of
insecurity.” 204 In the case of immigration, policymakers defined “insecurity” through the
“Othering” of undocumented immigrants, thus validating the increasing of border
security to control these unwanted border crossers. 205 For example, a 1981 report
submitted by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP)
criminalized undocumented immigrants as a “fugitive underground class” that would
cause “unhealthy” effects on society and the economy if left uncontrolled. 206 The report’s
xenophobic discourse summarized the “pernicious effects” this “uncontrolled hemorrhage
of people” by stating,
Most serious is the fact that illegality breeds illegality. The presence of a
substantial number of undocumented/illegal aliens in the United States has
resulted not only in a disregard for immigration law but in the breaking of
minimum wage and occupational safety laws, and statues against smuggling as
well. As long as undocumented migration flouts U.S. immigration law, its most
devastating impact may be the disregard it breeds for other U.S. laws. 207
Similar to the bodily metaphors used to the characterize previous waves of unwanted
Chinese immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century, the language used by SCIRP
dehumanized undocumented immigrants by constructing their illegality as a
uncontrollable breeding entity capable of consuming all of U.S. law. This xenophobic
metaphor defined undocumented immigrants as dangerous “animals” requiring state
control rather than as human beings seeking economic opportunity. Foucault argues such
dehumanization is a form of bio-power by which the people are distributed along a
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continuum of “value and utility” so that those in power may “hierachize” society to their
advantage. 208 By relegating undocumented immigrants to the category of animals,
policymakers ensured their subordinated status. Additionally, SCIRP’s report portrayed
undocumented immigrants as economic threats that intentionally “break” wage and safety
laws, ignoring the state’s role in allowing the systematic exploitation of these untraceable
laborers by employers. SCIRP’s depiction of undocumented immigrations as lawless,
breeding “animals” relegated them to a position of powerlessness and stripped them of
the political agency to resist Congress’ closing of the “half-open door of
undocumented/illegal migration” through increased border security and tracking
mechanisms. 209
The classist and xenophobic narratives of SCIRP’s report incited fear in
policymakers, redirecting their focus on the territorial borders and placing the primary
site of state control at the locations where illegal entries occurred. SCIRP pushed their
border control agenda forward by creating a sense of urgency to the problem of illegal
immigration, warning policymakers that failing to “reduce illegal entries sharply” would
result in “grave” social costs. 210 These exclusionary nationalist narratives of security
charged policymakers with controlling the border and influenced a large-scale overhaul
of border security, placing “faith in the power of technology and manpower to guide and
regulate international borders” and encouraging the borrowing of militarized solutions to
bring America’s borders “under control.” 211 Anthropologist Josiah McC. Heyman draws
from Foucault to argue that policymakers constitute the border as a “locus and means of
[state] domination” over “criminalized aliens,” establishing the border as a “modern
expertise of creating and tracking a marked population.” 212 SCIRP’s report set a
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precedent for immigration reform debates for the next two decades that concentrated on
tracking the “marked population” of immigrant “fugitives,” eventually leading to the
passage of both the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. 213
The IRCA and the IIRIRA institutionalized the classist and xenophobic discourses
of exclusionary nationalism circulating in Congress, continuing to see undocumented
immigrants as threats requiring increased surveillance and control. The IIRCA mandated
“an increase in the border patrol and other inspection and enforcement activities . . . in
order to prevent and deter the illegal entry of aliens,” allocating over 400 million dollars
to border security, hiring and training more border patrol officers, installing sensor
systems, increasing the number of search planes and helicopters, and building detention
cells. 214 Following suit, the IIRIRA instituted the deployment of “border patrol agents in
those areas of the border identified as areas of high illegal entry . . . in order to provide a
uniform and visible deterrent to illegal entry.” 215 To accomplish this “uniform and visible
deterrent,” the IRRIRA increased the number of border patrol officers to 10,000 and
expanded the use of existing technologies, contributing to an increase of $1.5 billion
spent on border control in 1994 to $3.9 billion in 1999. 216 These tactics were celebrated
by policymakers as having “moved the Border Patrol into the 21st century of law
enforcement . . . [enabling] field managers to more effectively apprehend and accurately
track the crossing patterns of illegal entrants.” 217 As a result, little space remained for
“illegal entrants” to resist state discipline.
Foucault argues that such complex and visible systems of technology are
implemented solely for the purpose of reinforcing the position of the nation-state as a
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“super-power” over its trackable subjects. 218 In the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, the
“super-power” of the United States demonstrated its strength through the militarization of
the border and the implementation of technologies focused on disciplining the illegal
immigrant body. The act of locating the problem of immigration at the border
simultaneously institutionalized and rationalized the discourse of disobedience attributed
to illegal immigrant bodies because their immigration could be viewed as a direct
violation of the law. 219 Furthermore, these narratives of disobedience surrounding
undocumented immigrants legitimized the use of technologies to seal the most popular
points of illegal entry, redirecting the flow of illegal immigration through the treacherous
deserts of Arizona and increasing the risk of immigrant deaths. 220 Sociologist Wayne
Cornelius argues the increased physical risk of crossing the border should not be treated
as an “unintended” consequence of tightened border security since this risk is an “integral
part of INS’ ‘prevention through deterrence’” strategy; therefore, the risk of death
became yet another technology of control exerted over the immigrant body. 221
The xenophobic and classist narratives of national security influencing the
immigration policies of the 1980’s and 1990’s constructed the border as a site to regain
control of undocumented immigration and constituted the illegal immigrant as a
powerless object in need of discipline and undeserving of participation in the national
narrative. The rhetorical consequences of this control reified the state as the ultimate
authority over its subjects within the post-Cold War era, continued the exclusion of lower
class, non-White undocumented immigrants from the American national narrative, and
legitimized the use of disciplinary technologies to control those “Othered” by discourses
of exclusionary nationalism. These patterns continued through the turn of the twenty first
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century when the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ignited the spread of
exclusionary nationalist discourses constructing immigration policy as the ultimate
safeguard of national security. The following section examines the xenophobic and racist
narratives of exclusionary nationalism dominating the debate on immigration after the
attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon in 2001, and how these
narratives influenced the creation of sophisticated tracking systems of the PATRIOT Act
that further reduced the political and social power of the non-White immigrant body.
Constituting Terrorists through Immigration Policy: The Rhetorical Creation of the
Terrorist Enemy and Narratives of Defense after September 11, 2001
At the turn of the twenty first century, narratives focused on loosening
immigration restrictions briefly surged with the spread of the worker’s justice movement
and the liberalized, pro-immigrant agenda of labor unions. However, the growing
influence of these narratives on immigration policy came to a sudden halt after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sparked an international anti-terrorism
campaign. 222 After September 11th, the national narrative dramatically shifted to
protecting the United States from the enemy that attacked the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. 223 Attorney General John Ashcroft summarized this
rhetorical shift when he spoke to the Senate Committee just days after the attack. “This
new terrorist threat to Americans on our soil is a turning point in America’s history. . . .
Our fight against terrorism is not merely or primarily a criminal justice endeavor—it is
defense of our nation and its citizens.” 224 Ashcroft’s emphasis on defending the nation
against the threat of terrorism marked the turning point in U.S. history when racist,
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xenophobic, and fear-driven narratives of national security against a terrorist enemy
dominated the discourses of policymakers.
In the wake of September 11th, members of President George W. Bush’s
administration used racist and xenophobic narratives to create a sense of urgency for
increasing border security, rhetorically constituting an invisible terrorist enemy to
legitimize the immediate implementation of policies focused on surveillance, discipline,
and control. Rhetoricians David Domke, et. al. argue that presidential administrations
strategically “dominate public discourse” after a national crisis, controlling all
information disseminated to Congress and the public in order to “foster support for, and
adoption of, government policies.” 225 Much like President Roosevelt’s administration
played off of public fears after the attack on Pearl Harbor to justify the internment of
thousands of Japanese residents, Bush’s administration capitalized on the fear of future
acts of terrorism, encouraging political solidarity against Muslim extremists and swaying
policymakers to enforce some of the most restrictive policies to date in the name of the
“War on Terrorism.” In his address to “Congress and the American people,” Bush spoke
of the “enemies of freedom” who “kill not merely to end lives” but to “disrupt and end a
way of life.” 226 He went on,
The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism . . . that perverts the
peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill
Christians, Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military
and civilians, including women and children. . . . They are the heirs of all the
murderous ideologies of the 20th century. 227
Bush’s racially-based rhetoric juxtaposed the innocent, rational American people against
the radical, dishonest, and dangerous Islamic enemy. He likened them to savages
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“sacrificing” lives for their violent ideologies, distancing them from the civilized
Christian world. 228
Furthermore, President Bush racialized the terrorist enemy as inherently Arab,
constructing a rhetorical image of terrorists as being the newest model of non-White
racial “Others” threatening the dominant White American narrative. Bush’s rhetorical
strategy of “Othering” was not only meant to persuade Congress to support efforts to
strengthen national security (and, by extension, fund the “War on Terror”), but also to
reestablish the dominant position of American national narrative (as well as his
presidency) as a symbol of all that is good and virtuous. 229 By juxtaposing the White
American national narrative against the “dark and evil” Islamic narrative, Bush created a
terrorist enemy worthy of discipline, requiring surveillance, and deserving control.
Bush’s narrative of political solidarity left little room for policymakers to negotiate
alternative narratives in response to the crisis of September 11th, and policymakers were
forced to stand with the president in pursuing his administration’s agenda to avoid being
labeled “hazardous and unpatriotic.” 230 The timing and context of this racist, xenophobic,
fear-driven rhetorical strategy inevitably resulted in the overwhelming passage of
controversial and restrictive Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, commonly referred to as the
PATRIOT Act, just six weeks after the attacks on September 11th. 231
The exclusionary nationalist narratives expressed within the expedited
Congressional hearings of the PATRIOT Act blurred the rhetorical division between
foreign nationals and terrorists. Though policymakers stated the importance of continued
immigration into the United States, many of them constructed the border and its crossers
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as potential sites for danger. Senate Chairman Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) stated in the
opening testimony, “Strengthening the security of our borders is an indispensable part of
this Nation’s effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. We must develop policies and enact
laws that meet the serious security threats we face from abroad.” 232 Senator Sam
Brownback (R-KS) added to Kennedy’s comments when he stated, “The terrorist attacks
of September 11th have unsettled the public’s confidence in our Nation’s security . . .
clearly, our immigration laws and policies are instrumental to the war on terrorism. While
the battle may be waged on many fronts, for the man and woman on the streets
immigration is the front line.” 233 Both Kennedy and Brownback framed border control as
a weapon of war against terrorism. They argued that failing to secure the border would
inevitably lead to a future terrorist attack. This rhetorical construction of the border as an
indispensable weapon of national security automatically constitutes the 31 million foreign
nationals legally entering the United States as possible terrorists. 234
By placing the border at the heart of the war on terrorism, the rhetorical
distinction between immigrant and terrorist collapses since both traverse the border;
therefore, both require discipline and control. Ashcroft championed a strict approach to
control when he stated to Congress, “We cannot wait for terrorists to strike to begin
investigations and make arrests. The death tolls are too high, the consequences too great.
We must prevent first, prosecute second.” 235 He supported the arrests and detainment of
suspicious immigrants, whether or not proof of their criminality existed. Foucault argues
this “[tactic] of intervention over all criminals, actual or potential” is based upon the
power relations between the state and the delinquent immigrant body, ultimately leading
to “the objectification of criminals and crimes,” real or imagined, by the dominant
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state. 236 All immigrants, then, were constituted as suspects of terrorism in order to
legitimize the state’s increased control over their movements, resulting in the
implementation of the sophisticated electronic tracking and reporting systems such as
those outlined in the PATRIOT Act. 237
As a result of the increased internal enforcement instituted in the PATRIOT Act,
Arab and Muslim immigrants were objectified by racially informed narratives of
exclusionary nationalism and victimized by state-sanctioned acts of racial profiling. A
reporter on race relations, Harriet Barovick defines profiling as “police practicing of
viewing certain characteristics as indicators of criminal behavior.” 238 Racial profiling,
then, is the practice of using racial characteristics to define criminal behavior. Just as
Japanese residents were victims of racial profiling after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Arabs
and Muslims were profiled as potential terrorists by the state. Though policymakers did
not outwardly define terrorists as Arabs or Muslims, the fact that the hijackers of
September 11th were Arab immigrants representing a Muslim extremist ideology
constituted a public image of terrorism as inherently Middle Eastern. This shared image
of terrorism influenced anti-Muslim backlash, countering Congress’ condemnation of
discrimination towards Arabs and Muslims in H.Con.Res.227 and contributing to more
than 60,000 cases of racial profiling against Arab or Muslim individuals in the year
following the terrorist attacks. 239 The historical parallels between the profiling of
Japanese residents during WWII and the criminalization of Arabs and Muslims in the
wake of September 11th demonstrate the continued dominance of exclusionary
nationalism, suggesting the White American national narrative set forth by the Founding
Fathers will maintain its position of political power for decades to come.
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In the nine years following September 11th, the institutionalization of exclusionary
nationalism via immigration policy has become a more localized phenomenon.
Sociologist Robyn Rodriguez argues that the PATRIOT Act marked a trend toward the
“securitization” of migration through the “interiorizing” and “localizing” of immigration
enforcement. 240 The securitization of migration rhetorically constructs the immigrant as a
disobedient object under surveillance, disciplining their bodies not only via check points,
computer tracking systems, and documentation, but also by their rhetorical positioning as
a perceived threat to American society in need of such tough surveillance. This process of
securitization is further normalized as the state encourages ordinary U.S. citizens to
report “suspicious activity” to local and state officials. 241 Over the past decade, many
citizens have taken this charge, including the Minutemen who pledge to “use every legal
means at [their] disposal to assist law enforcement authorities in identifying and
apprehending those who violate our borders.” 242 This trend towards interiorizing and
localizing immigration enforcement has also influenced a string of restrictive policies
enacted at the state level including California’s Proposition 187 in 1994, Arizona’s
Senate Bill 1070 in 2010, and increasing partnerships between Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and local law enforcement in counties participating in 287(g). Such
policies aimed at limiting access as well as identifying and deporting undocumented
immigrants are rooted in over two hundred years of assimilationist, racist, xenophobic,
and classist narratives. As a result, United States immigration policy in the twenty first
century continues to legitimize anti-immigrant rhetoric, widen social divisions between
legal and illegal immigrants, and codify the exclusion of unwanted (undocumented)
immigrants from the American national narrative.
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Conclusion
The rhetorical and ideological dominance of exclusionary nationalism and its four
key features—assimilationism, racism, xenophobia, and classism—has shaped
Congressional discourses and influences exclusive immigration policy, resulting in the
maintenance of American nationalism’s privileged position. Consequently, the
objectification of non-White immigrant “Others” through mechanisms of surveillance of
control has remained a reoccurring tactic for maintaining power relations throughout U.S.
history. This objectification has systematically excluded non-White immigrants from the
national narrative and relegated them to a position of permanent social and political
inferiority.
The constitutive subordination of non-White immigrant “Others” within the
American national narrative has real material consequences for those marginalized.
Social hierarchies are structured in a way to provide those in power certain “favorable
outcomes” including material goods, access to resources, life chances, social and
economic status, individual autonomy, and ideological privileging. 243 The rhetorical and
institutional exclusion of immigrant “Others” from the national narrative has denied them
access to these favorable outcomes, perpetuating their subordination in a hierarchical
society that privileges the elite few. Furthermore, their marginalization from the public
sphere prevents non-White immigrant “Others” from forming politically relevant
counternarratives to resist the dominant rhetoric of exclusionary nationalism. Thus, the
institutionalization of exclusionary nationalism through policy constitutes an
indestructible hierarchical system of race and class relations in the United States that
privileges White elitists over non-White immigrant “Others.”

69

Through a historical and rhetorical exploration of how the American national
narrative has been strategically constituted by policymakers via exclusionary nationalist
discourses, and then institutionalized through restrictive immigration policy focused on
controlling the immigrant body, I have set the stage for an investigation of my primary
case study: the American DREAM Act. The following chapter provides a comprehensive
analysis of the contemporary testimonies surrounding the DREAM Act. Using a 2007
hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security, and International Law, I consider the following questions: What are the major
rhetorical themes and patterns used by supporters and opponents of the DREAM Act?
How do these themes and patterns (re)construct the meaning of the immigrant, and for
whom is it (re)constructed? What are the political consequences of this (re)construction?
Through an exploration of the testimonies provided by supporters of the DREAM
Act, I argue that subordinated immigrant “Others” and their political allies fail to
challenge the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism and, instead, reify the
rhetorical power of assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses within the
public debate on immigration reform. Additionally, I argue policymakers who oppose the
DREAM Act exemplify over two hundred years of exclusionary nationalist discourses
and preserve an elitist definition of American identity that excludes unwanted immigrants
from its purview. Finally, I conclude the project with an analysis of the larger scale
rhetorical and material consequences of the narratives surrounding the DREAM Act,
suggesting new rhetorical strategies for immigrant “Others” who wish to challenge their
marginalization from the national narrative and incite long term social change.
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Chapter Two
Resisting and Reinforcing Exclusionary Nationalism in the DREAM Act Debates

On November 10, 2010, a dozen students dressed in high school graduation caps
and gowns gathered at the University of Texas at San Antonio to declare a hunger strike
and to urge the passing of a federal bill that would provide a path to legal status for
undocumented immigrant youth. 244 Since 2001, student-led groups around the country
have fought for the passage of the Development, Relief, and Education of Alien Minors
Act, or DREAM Act, a bill that would provide a path to legal status for thousands of
undocumented immigrant youth who have been raised in the United States. “It’s been 10
years and we are still here struggling and fighting,” said Claudia, a University of Texas at
San Antonio student hoping for a path to legal status. “We are tired that our voices have
not been heard.” 245 Claudia is one of thousands of young immigrants struggling to have
her voice heard in a public sphere that privileges the White political elite. If it were to
pass, the DREAM Act would break down institutionalized barriers to citizenship for
undocumented immigrant youth who are currently excluded from the American national
narrative. The possibility of the bill’s passage has spurred national debate over the
definition of “American,” allowing undocumented youth like Claudia the possibility to
challenge the hegemonic definition of citizenship and resist the exclusivity of the
American identity.
As demonstrated in chapter one, the American national identity is constituted by
the dominant narrative of exclusionary nationalism. Through assimilationist, racist,
xenophobic, and classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism, policymakers of Anglo-
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Saxon heritage narrate an American identity that privileges the White elite over the
marginalized non-White “Other.” Historian Benedict Anderson explains that nations are
“imagined communities” in which the political elite strategically constitutes an
illusionary “American people” that is Anglicized in its heritage and upper class in its
status in order to maintain their privileged position of power. 246 In the case of
immigration, policymakers make up the political elite and have used law to preserve the
dominance of their homogenous national narrative, making immigration policy a “culture
of argument” that reifies the dominant narrative of exclusionary nationalism. 247 This
institutionalization of exclusionary nationalism rhetorically constructs a dominant
hegemonic public favoring the narratives that strengthen the Anglo-Saxon national
identity while subordinating the narratives of non-White immigrant “Others” that threaten
this homogenous ideal.
The notion of the hegemonic public is first and foremost ideological. It assumes
its own dominance and perpetuates its own power by institutionalizing the terms of
political discourse. Philosopher Jürgen Habermas explains that in the emergence of the
modern state, the “line between state and society . . . divided the public sphere from the
private realm” and constituted the state and the court as “public authority” over the
familial, personal, and private domain. 248 By “defining what is ‘political’ in the discourse
sense” through policy, the state has maintained its privileged position as a dominant
public and reinforces the exclusion of the private sphere. 249 Rhetorician James Boyd
White contends that the exclusion of the personal from the political often goes unnoticed.
He states, “Whatever cannot be talked about in these bureaucratic ways is simply not
talked about . . . this kind of bureaucratic talk is largely unself-conscious about what it
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excludes. The world it sees is its whole world.” 250 Thus, the state remains the official site
for political debate, participation, and opinion formation whereas the private sphere is
exiled to a nonpolitical, personal domain.
Foucault’s concept of “subjugated knowledge” is central to the study of
marginalized personal narratives and their ability, or inability, to challenge the state’s
hegemonic public. This “disqualified . . . insufficiently elaborated . . . naïve . . .
hierarchically inferior” knowledge makes up the experiences of the subordinated. 251 The
state suppresses the public expression of subjugated knowledge because the seeming
absence of dissent implies that silence is compliance; therefore, the state can suggest
these groups are willing to participate in their own marginalization as well as justify the
maintenance of unequal power relations. 252 Foucault suggests that the political elite fears
these “nonlegitimized knowledges” because they question the validity of state’s
hegemonic knowledge and challenge their position of power. As long as the state controls
the terms of public discourse, it eliminates the possibility for marginalized groups to
make their subjugated knowledge politically relevant, thereby maintaining the state’s
privileged position of power. According to social scholar Bob Pease, the fears of the state
are warranted because subordinated groups that are successful in resisting the state’s
authority often do so through the “insurrection of subjugated knowledge;” whereas, those
that fail in challenging their own oppression also fail in making their subjugated
knowledge known. 253 Rhetorician Pierre Bourdieu adds to this argument, stating,
“dominated individuals . . . cannot constitute themselves as a separate group, mobilize
themselves or mobilize their potential power unless they question the categories of
perception of the social order.” 254 Thus, the “insurrection of subjugated knowledge” is
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essential to politically empowering marginalized groups who wish to challenge the status
quo and bring about long-term social change.
In order to understand the possibility for marginalized immigrant groups to defy
the oppressive “unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organize
them into a hierarchy,” scholars must investigate the processes by which these groups
both succeed and fail in challenging the state’s oppressive authority through the
expression of subjugated knowledge. 255 Feminist scholars lead the charge in challenging
the authority of institutional knowledge that subjugates all other knowledge.
Scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins argue that one’s personal, marginalized experience
is ultimately political and encourage marginalized groups to expose social and scientific
gender-biases through the expression of their subjugated knowledge. 256 Hill draws on
Foucault’s concept that knowledge, or “truth,” is socially constructed; therefore, what is
regarded by the masses as “truth” has political power and influence over societal
norms. 257 Hence, the ability of subordinated immigrant groups to make their subjugated
“truths” known and understood by the masses determines the extent to which they will be
successful in challenging the status quo of exclusionary nationalism.
Viewing the political discourse surrounding immigration policy through a critical
feminist lens, one finds the personal experiences of subordinated immigrants constitute a
subjugated knowledge that challenges hegemonic notions of nation and citizenship. The
features of this subjugated knowledge are constituted in the ways marginalized
experiences depart from the dominant ideology of exclusionary nationalism. Feminist
scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak explains that subjugated knowledge is recognized
only as a “deviation from an ideal;” therefore, in order for subjugated knowledge to be
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realized, one must identify the knowledge, or narrative, defined as the norm. 258 In the
case of immigration, the narrative of exclusionary nationalism—marked by its
assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist rhetoric—constitutes the normative
national identity. Within this context, the subjugated knowledge of non-White immigrant
“Others” is that which challenges the hegemonic notions of exclusionary nationalism that
reserve the American identity for White elitists. Although the possibility for subjugated
knowledge exists among immigrant groups, these groups may not always succeed in
insurrecting this knowledge as politically relevant. Therefore, investigating the processes
by which subordinated immigrant “Others” either fail or succeed in politicizing their
truths, norms, and identities is essential to understanding the possibility for them to resist
the narrative dominance of resist exclusionary nationalism.
In this chapter I explore the narratives employed by both supporters and
opponents of the Development, Relief, and Education for Minors Act (DREAM Act),
analyzing how these narratives maintain the narrative of exclusionary nationalism. Using
Charland, Habermas, Foucault, and others, I analyze the rhetorical features found within
the congressional testimony surrounding the DREAM Act, investigating the ways in
which DREAM Act supporters and opponents adopt the dominant discourses of
exclusionary nationalism when debating the bill. I argue that opponents of the bill control
the terms of the debate by drawing on exclusionary nationalist notions of American
identity, while supporters fail to politicize their subjugated knowledge in a way that
would eradicate the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism and spur long term
social change. In this analysis, I ask the following questions: What are the major
rhetorical themes and patterns used by supporters and opponents of the DREAM Act?
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How do these themes and patterns (re)construct the meaning of the immigrant, and for
whom is it (re)constructed? What are the political consequences of this (re)construction?
My primary case study will be based on the congressional hearing held on May
18, 2007, regarding the future of undocumented students. 259 I begin analyzing the three
main rhetorical themes within the testimony of supporters, demonstrating how their
discourse reflects assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist ideals. First, I explore
the ways in which supporters uphold restrictive the ideology of assimilationism by
framing the DREAM Act as a pathway toward integration into the American (White)
culture. Secondly, I discuss how their testimony supports the classist construction of
American exceptionalism, a concept that exists because of their own economic
oppression. Finally, I argue supporters fail to liberate themselves from state control
because they choose not to indict the society in which they desperately want to be
included. Subsequently, I argue critics of the DREAM Act further delegitimize the
rhetorical and political power of DREAM Act supporters by perpetuating the narrative
dominance of exclusionary nationalism as the primary rhetorical frame for the public
debate on immigration. Throughout this analysis, I make connections between the 2007
testimonies and the historical immigration debates highlighted in chapter one. The
following section provides a brief congressional history of the DREAM Act, setting the
stage for the rhetorical analysis of the 2007 hearing.
Challenging the Public Debate: Making Space for the DREAM Act
Discourses of national security have dominated the public debate on immigration
since the passage of the PATRIOT Act in 2001. In the decade following the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, the conservative agenda has focused on “all the measures
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. . . designed to keep Americans safer," with much of the emphasis on border control, the
apprehension and deportation of undocumented immigrants, and the preservation of
American exceptionalism. 260 During his 2008 Presidential campaign, Senator John
McCain (R-AZ), a primary leader in the public debate on immigration, emphasized the
need to “secure our borders . . . because it’s a matter of national security.” 261 As the
United States enters its 112th Congress, ten years after the infamous terrorist attacks,
conservative legislators such as Senator Mike Johanns (R-NB) refuse to address other
issues of immigration reform until we “fix the border problems.” 262 Johanns believes
“border security is important to the safety of U.S. citizens,” claiming that “nobody can
tell you who came over the border last night or if they’re coming for unlawful purposes.
That’s a serious problem for a nation that’s battling with terrorism.” 263 By correlating
border control with national security, McCain, Johanns, and like-minded policymakers
have altered the rhetorical image of the terrorist from inherently Arab to illegal
Southwest border crossers. Stemming from the hegemonic conflation of “Mexicans” with
“illegal aliens,” this anti-immigrant sentiment is disguised under the mantle of national
security, upholding racial hierarchies of power and perpetuating the racialization of
unwanted immigrants. 264 Consequently, these policymakers manipulate the public debate
on immigration to center on national security in order to justify increased internal
enforcement policies, leaving little rhetorical space for the highly subjugated and
vulnerable Hispanic immigrant “Others” to challenge anti-terrorist discourses and liberate
themselves from a position of powerlessness. 265
The rhetorical construction of undocumented immigrants as national threats shifts
the public debate on immigration inward, making internal enforcement a pillar of anti-
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terrorist strategy while subordinating pro-immigrant policies. As a result of the increased
attention on national security starting since 2001, forced removals of undocumented
immigrants in 2009 reached close to 400,000 (only 128,000 of which were known
criminals), demonstrating a dramatic increase from 200,000 removals in 2005 and 40,000
in 1995. 266 To justify this strengthening of internal enforcement, policymakers have
coupled the framing of illegal border crossers as economic threats with fear rhetoric that
claims that “uncontrollable” illegal immigrants are potential terrorists.
The coupling of immigration and terrorism was prevalent during a hearing on the
9/11 Recommendations Implementations Act. Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX)
expressed his support of “the expansion of expedited removal” because “every day
thousands of aliens enter the country illegally. . . . Potential terrorists will attempt to cross
our land borders, and we should help the administration stop these terrorists from
entering the United States.” 267 Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) added that
strong deportation laws are designed to “prevent terrorists from coming to our borders;
or, if they get inside the United States, making sure that they do not game the system to
be able to stay here and have the time to plot to do ill to America and its people and its
values.” 268 Just as policymakers defined Mexican border crossers as criminals to justify
the Mexican Repatriation Drive of 1930, Smith’s and Sensenbrenner’s statements used
fear rhetoric to frame undocumented immigrants as dangerous terrorists. The
intensification of these fear-driven, anti-terrorist discourses during post September 11th
congressional debates have resulted in restrictive immigration measures such as the
building of a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border and enhancing security technologies to
deter and apprehend so-called “potential terrorists.” 269 As a consequence, immigrants
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crossing the Southwest territorial border have become the primary targets of state control
and are powerless to influence the public debate on immigration reform in a way that
would challenge existing power relations.
In addition to constituting immigrants as threats to national security, many
policymakers continue to frame undocumented immigrants as dangers to economic
security. They draw on national narratives of prosperity, claiming that the “widespread
availability of cheap labor” created by undocumented immigrants entering the country
“[depresses] wages,” ultimately threatening to “drive America down into the depths of
the third world” and end “American exceptionalism.” 270 Historian Arnon Gutfeld writes
of how social mobility is perceived in the United States as a “must” rather than a
possibility, assuming a “classless meritocratic society” in which the individual takes his
economic fate in his or her own hands. 271 These materialistic myths of American
exceptionalism have been fiercely protected by policymakers since the country’s
inception, constituting a rhetorical and cultural fabrication that links national identity to
wealth.
Under the auspices of protecting the “right” of economic prosperity from
unwanted immigrant labor competition, policymakers implement restrictive policies to
limit the entry of as well as force the removal of immigrant laborers. They ignore the fact
that the United States’ ability to remain globally competitive relies on the exploitation of
undocumented workers within numerous industries such as agriculture, poultry,
hospitality, and construction. 272 Instead of drawing attention to law-breaking employers
that hire and exploit undocumented workers, policymakers take aim at immigrant
laborers and construct them as the villains requiring state control. Similarly to the
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strategies used to justify the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the National Origins Act
of 1921, policymakers today manipulate the so-called threat of economic competition.
They frame illegal border crossers as the ultimate national threats in order to validate
heightened border security and stricter enforcement laws, thereby reducing the political
power of subordinated immigrants to resist state control.
Pro-immigrant organizations such as Reform Immigration for America and the
National Council de la Raza criticize the rhetorical construction of immigrants as national
threats. They argue that the use of internal enforcement to “protect the nation,” such as
strengthening deportation laws and funding surveillance technology along the land
borders, ignores the greater problems of the country’s immigration system. These
organizations challenge the public discourses constituting immigrants as dangerous,
highlighting the economic benefits for providing a path to legal status for an estimated
twelve million undocumented immigrants, the need to increase penalties for employers
who abuse undocumented immigrants, and the economic imperative to create new legal
channels for laborers to enter the country and maintain America’s global
competitiveness. 273 Despite their efforts to pass comprehensive immigration reform bills
addressing these issues, the dominant narrative constituting undocumented immigrants as
“a serious national security problem” prevails because it establishes narrative fidelity for
exclusionary nationalism, allowing policymakers to rationalize restrictive immigration
policies. 274 Thus, competing notions of immigration reform that aim to liberalize
immigration policies and reconstruct these criminalized peoples as members of the
national community continue to be marginalized by anti-terrorism discourses of national
security.
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The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), a
policy that aims to increase educational and economic access for qualifying immigrant
“Others,” is one such policy minimized by the dominant framing of the immigration as a
threat to national security. 275 After a six year legislative history, the DREAM Act was
introduced to the 110th Congress in 2007 by Congressman Howard Berman (D-CA) as
H.R. 1275 and Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) as both part of the comprehensive reform
bill S. 1348 as well as the stand-alone bill S. 2205. 276 Introduced as an effort to “keep our
country from squandering the promise of thousands of young people who have been
raised here,” but who “face tremendous obstacles in reaching their potential because,
through no fault of their own, they exist in a legal limbo with no way to adjust their
immigration status,” the DREAM Act seeks to provide legal status to undocumented
immigrant youth. 277
Created for young immigrants marginalized from the national narrative, liberal
policymakers such as Durbin believe “[the DREAM Act] is not just the right thing to do,
it is good for America. The DREAM Act would allow students with great potential and
ambitions to contribute more fully to our society.” 278 If passed, the DREAM Act would
authorize the “cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of certain alien students
who are long-term United States residents and who entered the United States as
children,” stopping the deportation of thousands of young immigrants who qualify for an
adjustment of status under the terms the Act sets forth. 279 Additionally, the DREAM Act
would overturn section 505 of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) that prohibits states from granting postsecondary education
benefits to unauthorized aliens and increasing their access to the “American Dream.” 280
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Throughout the past decade, the DREAM Act has had a tumultuous legislative
history. After failing cloture in 2001, 2003, and 2005, the DREAM Act came close to
passing in 2007 when it failed in the Senate by a vote of 52-44. 281 The fact that only eight
votes were needed to pass the DREAM Act demonstrated to supporters of the bill that
pro-immigrant legislation was gaining momentum in the public debate on immigration
reform; therefore, Senator Durbin and Congressman Berman made the decision to
reintroduce new versions of the DREAM Act (S. 729 and H.R. 1751) to the 111th
Congress on March 26, 2009. 282
After S. 729 and H.R. 1751 failed to make it out of committee, Senator Harry
Reid (D-NV) attached the Senate version of the bill to the Defense Authorization Bill (S.
3454) in hopes it would pass as an amendment. 283 On September 21, 2010, cloture was
defeated for the Defense Authorization Bill and its proposed DREAM Act amendment by
a vote of 56-43. 284 The following day, Durbin reintroduced the Senate version of the bill
as S. 3827, later revising the bill to include more restrictions addressing oppositional
concerns such as a ten year period of conditional nonimmigrant status, a ban on family
petitions, and the prohibition of universities from offering in-state tuition rates to
beneficiaries of the act. 285 This version never came to a vote because on December 8,
2010, the House passed their version of the DREAM Act, H.R. 6497, with a vote of 216
to 198. 286 Senator Reid, then, replaced the Senate bill with the version passed by the
House and introduced it for a vote on December 18, 2010; however, this final version of
the DREAM Act failed in the Senate by a vote of 55-41, just five votes short of a 60-vote
majority. 287 Despite multiple attempts, the 111th Congress failed to pass this landmark
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legislation and the battle for the DREAM Act continues as a more conservative Congress
enters the 112th legislative session in 2011.
As each version of the DREAM Act came before committees and, in some cases,
the Senate floor for a vote, policymakers and witnesses who testified on behalf of the bill
reinforced the assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses of exclusionary
nationalism. Legal scholar Phyllis Pease Chock explains that hearings like these are sites
of “cultural reproduction, as canonical versions of national myths and hegemonic
ideology encompass the speakers’ disparate renderings of events.” 288 In the case of
immigration policies such as the DREAM Act, the national myth perpetuated in the
congressional hearing room is exclusionary nationalism. One example of a DREAM Act
hearing dominated by exclusionary nationalism is the House hearing held on May 18,
2007, on the future of undocumented students. This hearing might have provided a brief,
yet significant, public space in which subordinated immigrant counternarratives could
have challenged the exclusionary discourses of national security; however, supporters of
the DREAM Act failed to produce any counternarrative that contested the exclusive
national narrative and politicized their subjugated knowledge. Rather than making
attempts to “break out of the myths’ terms and to undermine the myth-making process,”
DREAM Act supporters, albeit unintentionally, reified the rhetorical myth of
exclusionary nationalism responsible for their marginalization. 289
Held as part of a series of hearings on the situation of immigrants in the United
States, the objective of the May18, 2007, hearing was to provide a public space to discuss
the implications of the DREAM Act. 290 Those invited to speak to the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the
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Committee on the Judiciary included three immigrant women and four representatives for
political and educational organizations. The three immigrant women invited to testify
were Ms. Maria Nazareth Gonzalez of Costa Rica, Ms. Martine Mwanji Kalaw of
Zambia, and Ms. Tam Tran of Vietnam and Germany. 291 Following these women, four
“expert” panelists spoke on issues surrounding the DREAM Act. 292 These were Ms.
Diana Furchtgott-Roth of the Center for Employment Policy, then Mr. Allan Cameron,
Ph.D., a retired Arizona high school teacher, Mr. Jamie P. Merisotis of the Institute for
Higher Education Policy, and Mr. Kris W. Kobach of the University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Law. After each panelist spoke, policymakers were given the opportunity
to comment on their testimony and engage in a question and answer session.
The following section examines the testimonies of the three immigrant women
and their “expert” allies, demonstrating how their statements failed to eradicate the
dominance of exclusionary nationalism. I highlight three major rhetorical strategies
responsible for the reproduction of elitist narratives and argue these rhetorical strategies
reinforce rather than resist the narrative of exclusionary nationalism, altogether failing to
redefine the White elitist definition “American” and limiting the possibility for long term
social change through the passage of the DREAM Act. I begin with an analysis of using
discourses of assimilationism to frame immigrant “Others” as Americans, demonstrating
how these discourses ultimately sustain the narrative dominance of exclusionary
nationalism rather than establish a new inclusive American identity.
“We Are American”: Assimilationism and the Erasure of Subjugated Knowledge
In the 2007 hearing, DREAM Act supporters used assimilationist discourses to
establish ethos and enhance credibility with their audience. 293 To accomplish this, they
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drew upon familiar symbols of national imagery ethos and constituted the DREAM Act
as a “pathway toward assimilation” for already “Americanized” undocumented
immigrants. 294 By enacting assimilationist discourses of exclusionary nationalism,
supporters connected themselves with the moralistic categories already understood by
policymakers and, as rhetorician Maurice Charland reminds us, these policymakers were
constituted within the ideology of exclusionary nationalism. 295 Unfortunately, this
attempt to connect with the policymakers by employing assimilationist discourses
ignored the subjugated knowledge of undocumented immigrants and failed to
successfully challenge the dominant ideology responsible for their exclusion.
One way in which supporters of the DREAM Act neglected to make the
subjugated knowledge of undocumented immigrants politically relevant was by
“Americanizing” undocumented immigrants and ignoring any semblance of difference
that could allow for their narratives to challenge the dominance of exclusionary
nationalism. In the 2007 hearing, three immigrant women opened the testimony—Maria
Nazareth Gonzalez, Martine Mwanji Kalaw, and Tam Tran. At the time of the hearing,
Gonzalez and Tran lacked legal status and would have benefited from the passage of the
DREAM Act; whereas, Kalaw had recently obtained a successful adjustment of status. In
an attempt to persuade policymakers to pass the DREAM Act, each of the women
utilized discourses of assimilation to constitute themselves as Americans who deserve the
benefits of citizenry. For example, Gonzalez opened by stating, “I will always consider
the United States of America my home. . . . I love this country.” 296 Similarly, Kalaw
began with, “I am a proud New Yorker,” while Tam Tran opened with, “The truth is I
consider myself, culturally, an American as I have been American-raised and educated
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for the past 18 years.” 297 The panelists ignored their immigrant heritage and framed
themselves solely within the American identity, explaining how they are “part of an
American community.” 298 As historian Benedict Anderson explains, nations create a
“deep, horizontal comradeship” among members to encourage national fidelity and
sacrifice. 299 Expressing their pride in the United States, the witnesses exemplified this
fraternal connection to American nationality and authorized their fidelity to the imagined
nation. Moreover, speaking of their foreignness would have threatened this imagined
solidarity to the United States; therefore, they silenced expression of their subjugated
knowledge in order to perpetuate the dominant Anglicized notion of American identity.
Additionally, each of the panelists used a rhetorical strategy highlighting their
ability to assimilate to American values in order to reject the popular notion that they are
enemies of the state. They drew on symbols of American exceptionalism such as hard
work and self determination to tell of how their families came to live in the United States,
integrated into the community, and lived an American life. Gonzalez spoke of her
family’s migration from Costa Rica to the United States in search of “a better education,
a better life, and all together a better future.” 300 “Throughout all our years in the United
States,” she recalled, “we worked very hard for what we had, thinking that one day soon
we would be citizens.” 301 Gonzalez explained, “I am a junior from Jefferson City, MO,
currently attending Westminster College . . . majoring in Political Science and
International Business. . . . [I] have been living in the U.S. since the age of 5.” 302
Likewise, Tran shared her American experience. “I graduated with honors in American
Literature, was immediately hired full-time as a filmmaker by UCLA and was accepted to
a Ph.D. program in Cultural Studies.” 303 Similarly, Kalaw spoke of her job as a financial
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analyst with the New York Public Library and her previous jobs in the New York City
Mayor’s office, two institutional symbols of the American community. As they testified,
each of panelists exemplified immigrants who had successfully become part of the
American identity, rebuffing popular claims that undocumented immigrants aspire to
participate in dangerous and unlawful activities and highlighting that they, instead, adopt
the American values of education and hard work.
In addition to framing themselves as Americans and rejecting popular discourses
constructing them as terrorists, the panelists drew upon the rhetorical symbols of voting
and the Fourth of July to demonstrate their fidelity to the nation. When Representative
Sheila Lee Jackson (D-TX) asked them if they were “teary [people] about patriotism and
loyalty” who felt a “sense of loyalty and patriotism and pride about America,” Gonzalez
responded, “Oh, my goodness, yes. Every Fourth of July, [I] cannot wait until the day
that I am a citizen and can proudly say that I am. . . . I am very much [a teary person
about patriotism and loyalty]. 304 Tran added, “We always feel like we are the ultimate
Americans, because it is something we don’t have access to. We always say like, ‘oh, my
gosh, we would totally go vote if we could. We would totally go do all these things if we
could.’” 305 When tested by Representative Lee to demonstrate their fidelity to the nation,
both Gonzalez and Tran expressed their ardent desire to participate in “all [those] things”
American to prove their worth as future citizens. Anderson explains that one’s attachment
to the national “invention of their imagination” is born through language. 306 Thus,
rhetorical symbols such as the process of voting and the singing of the national anthem
on national holidays create an “experience of simultaneity” and reinforce one’s
patriotism, loyalty, and subservience to the nation. 307 Gonzalez and Tran described the
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Fourth of July and the process of voting as essential pillars of American identity and
fidelity, insinuating that those excluded from participating in these events remain
permanent outsiders. This rhetorical strategy did little to renegotiate the position of both
legal and undocumented immigrants because it reified the power of the state over the
immigrant body. They framed themselves as the “ultimate Americans” willing to blindly
serve the state, rather than as subjugated objects of state control demanding a shift in
power liberate themselves from their marginalization.
Gonzalez’s, Kalaw’s, and Tran’s use of assimilationist discourses to redefine
themselves as Americans rather than terrorists maintained the dominant ideology of
exclusionary nationalism. Not only were their testimonies delegitimized when
policymakers asked them to state their desires to participate in American society, they
also failed to create a counternarrative critiquing the processes by which policymakers
constitute their foreignness as a national threat. Instead of defying exclusionary
nationalism, challenging its elitist cultural assumptions, or underscoring its injustice,
these immigrants only reaffirmed the dominant discourses responsible for their
subordination. By downplaying their subjugated human experience as marginalized
immigrants and constituting themselves as American, they authenticated the hegemonic
assumptions of an exclusive, White national identity. As a result, their testimonies greatly
limited the possibility for long term social change for undocumented immigrant youth
because they upheld the existing power relations within exclusionary nationalism.
Policymakers in favor of the DREAM Act also perpetuate the exclusivity of the
American identity through by using assimilationist discourses. For example, in the 2007
hearing Representative Lee remarked “these children are as American as apple pie.” 308
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Though Lee was speaking in support of the DREAM Act, her rhetoric both infantilized
and delegitimized the narratives of undocumented youth, reinforcing their participation in
the “paternal” and powerful state. Additionally, many supportive policymakers argued in
favor of the DREAM Act by framing it as a policy that will complete the process of
assimilation for already “Americanized” undocumented youth. Representative John
Conyers (D-MI) stated,
We want to provide incentives for people to acquire American values and
culture. And the pathway to assimilation for most immigrants is through their
children. They are the ones who first learn English. They are the ones who learn
American history and culture from school and their friends. It is our history and
culture that they think of as theirs. And they are the ones who help their parents
navigate bureaucracies, health care, and jobs. In other words, these children
are . . . Americanized. The law should recognize and encourage this dynamic. 309
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) added to Conyers’ statement, exclaiming, “We want
people who speak wonderful English. We want people who have great educations. We
want people who are assimilated and who love America. You are the answer to our
dreams. And hence the DREAM Act.” 310 Conyers’ and Lofgren’s statements reflected
those of the Founding Fathers as they expressed the same desire for immigrants to
acquire “American culture and values.” Just as Alexander Hamilton called for immigrants
“to learn the principles and imbide the spirit of our government,” Conyers and Lofgren
advocated for the assimilation of undocumented immigrant youth and constituted the
DREAM Act as the legal strategy to fully achieve Americanization. 311 Although they
recognized the subordinated immigrant “Others” as rhetorical members of the American
identity, Conyers and Lofgren perpetuated the narrative dominance of exclusionary
nationalism and neglected to challenge hegemonic assumptions of the Anglicized
national ideal.
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Using exclusionary nationalist discourses of assimilationism to reframe
marginalized immigrants as Americans rather than enemies of the state creates a
rhetorical tension through which DREAM Act supporters must cautiously navigate.
Although the familiar theme of assimilation creates ethos and closes the gaps privileging
“Americans” over immigrant “Others,” it also reifies their own their subordination by
preserving the dominance of exclusionary nationalism. Feminist scholar Audre Lorde
speaks to marginalized black feminists attempting to eradicate racism within White
feminist discourse, arguing that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the mater’s
house.” 312 Lorde’s warning applies to all subordinated groups who use dominant, elitist
discourse to bring about genuine social change. She argues its very usage reinforces “the
master’s” position of power and prevents social transformation; therefore, subordinated
immigrants who wish to challenge their position of powerlessness and encourage longterm social change should understand the rhetorical consequences of reenacting the
discourses of exclusionary nationalism. Using assimilationist discourses to persuade
policymakers to expand the definition of American to include immigrant “Others”
ultimately fails to destroy the institutionalized dominance of the exclusive national
narrative responsible for their exclusion. In order to challenge the state’s control over the
American identity, undocumented immigrants and their allies must master the art of
difference and redefine themselves outside of the dominant exclusionary nationalist
discourses.
In addition to employing exclusionary nationalist discourses of assimilation to
persuade policymakers to pass the DREAM Act, the panelists speaking in the 2007
hearing upheld the classist rhetoric of economic competition, constructing themselves as
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valuable assets to the American economy. They took on the myth of American
exceptionalism as their own, claiming that they are the key to maintaining the economic
power of the United States as global competition increases. Although this rhetorical
strategy challenges the notion that undocumented immigrants are potential terrorists, it
ultimately constitutes them as economic pawns of the state, further reducing the
possibility for long-term social change that liberates undocumented immigrants from
their marginalized position. The following section investigates how class-driven
testimonies reinforce the dominant narrative of exclusionary nationalism and perpetuate
the economic subordination of undocumented immigrants.
“We Are the American Dream”: The Conundrum of Classist Discourses
The panelists speaking in support of the DREAM Act in the 2007 hearing
strategically used classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism to construct
undocumented immigrant youth as economic necessities. Historically, the notion of
economic competition has been used to label unwanted immigrants as competitors who
threaten the financial security of the nation and, therefore, endanger the livelihood of its
citizens. Immigration policies such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the mass
deportation of Mexican laborers in the 1930’s, and the seizure of property of interned
Japanese in the 1940’s all were the result of widespread fears unwanted immigrants were
stealing American jobs and threatening the national economy. In the case of the 2007
hearing on the DREAM Act, supporters utilized classist discourses of economic
competition by constructing undocumented immigrant youth as valuable assets whose
skills and determination will improve the economy, labeling those who deny legal access
to these young workers are the new economic threat. Unfortunately, this rhetorical
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strategy did nothing to challenge exclusionary nationalism and, as a result, perpetuated
the reduction of immigrants as laborers serving the state’s economic interests.
Classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism constructed undocumented youth
as a necessary investment in the nation’s economy. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, a panelist
representing the Center for Employment Policy, stated of undocumented students,
They are hardworking and talented, and produce streams of income taxes and
Social Security payments that bolster our fiscal position. . . . This total of about 1
million potential workers represents .7 percent, less than 1 percent of our labor
force . . . even though these undocumented young people are a small group, they
have the potential to make an important contribution to our economy. . . . This
makes the educational investment worth it both for the students, but more
importantly for the rest of us. . . . because we have more productive citizens who
fill needed job openings and who can pay taxes. . . . the United States needs these
young workers. 313
Contrary to the dominant classist discourses blaming the immigrant “invasion” for
“[displacing] Americans from jobs” and “[placing]” heavy burdens” on the economy,
Furchtgott-Roth constituted immigrant youth as outstanding entrepreneurs who will fill
needed job openings and contribute to the strength of the American economy. 314
Additionally, Furchtgott-Roth used statistics from a 2005 Harvard University study to
argue that immigrants actually help raise average American wages by 0.1%,
demonstrating how increasing access to employment for immigrants would not have the
negative impact suggested by opponents of the DREAM Act. Although Furchtgott-Roth’s
testimony challenged the conventional rhetoric that frames immigrant laborers as
economic threats, it reinforced the classist construction of immigrants as token laborers
needed for the economic prosperity of the White nation. Moreover, her “expert”
testimony delegitimized the witnesses testifying before her. Rhetoricians Lorraine
Higgins and Lisa Brush argue that marginalized “Others” “rarely constitute a public
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perceived as capable or ‘expert’ enough to contribute anything valuable to public
debate.” 315 By inviting “expert” witnesses representing the “master’s language” to speak
after the immigrant “Others,” policymakers reduced the rhetorical power of the
immigrant women and their personal narratives.
Supporters of the DREAM Act perpetuated the myth of American exceptionalism,
thereby maintaining the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism. The “expert”
panelists in the 2007 hearing reinforced classist discourses when they portrayed
immigrant youth as contributors to the myth of American exceptionalism. For example,
Mr. Jamie Merisotis of the Institute for Higher Education Policy commented,
If you consider what our national workforce needs are in the specific sense of
human capital, it is clear we are looking at an enormous shortage of educated
workers in the not-too-distant future. . . . Investing in those who are already here
is our best hope for remaining competitive on a global scale. . . . The DREAM
Act is a common-sense piece of bipartisan legislation that provides these talented
and industrious future workers a pathway to citizenship. 316
Additionally, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) argued,
Our Nation is faced with ever increasing economic competition from developed
and developing nations. To effectively compete in an ever expanding global
market, we must ensure that we can continue to have the most educated workforce
in the world. Whether in college or in the military, we must give all qualified
young people the opportunity to contribute in ways that will keep America
strong. 317
Both Merisotis and Lofgren drew on the myth of maintaining American exceptionalism
to support the passage of the DREAM Act. They legitimated the rhetorical constructs
connecting economic status to national strength, claiming the key to keeping “America
strong” is to invest in undocumented immigrant youth. By doing so, they objectified
immigrants as being “human capital” only needed for the economic benefit of the state.
Additionally, Merisotis and Lofgren preserved the notion that uneducated immigrants
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remain a danger to society when they suggested that only educated immigrants would
benefit the U.S. economy. Just as policymakers excluded “unskilled” and “illiterate”
immigrants from participating in the national narrative in 1917 through the
implementation of illiteracy tests, Merisotis and Lofgren reserved access to the American
identity for only educated, skilled undocumented immigrants. 318
Using classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism, policymakers framed
skilled undocumented immigrant youth as integral parts of the capitalist machine rather
than as humans who deserve equal access to economic and social privilege. As Foucault
reminds us, a primary way in which the state preserves its position of power is to render
its people objects of its control. He argues that the state views the body as a “docile that
may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” for the purpose of stripping it of its
individual force of power and transforming it into an “aptitude” or “capacity” of the
state. 319 Labeling immigrants as “human capital” reinforces their powerless position as
docile and utilitarian objects, reducing immigrants to economic pawns needed to uphold
the power of the state. Thus, the rhetorical strategy of framing undocumented immigrant
youth as economic contributors fails to challenge the economic, racial, and social
hierarchies of power and severely limits the passage of future policy benefiting the
economic status of all marginalized immigrants, especially those immigrants furthest
away from the status quo. 320
Not only did the use of assimilationist and classist discourses fail to contest the
narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism, this strategy also restricted the ability
for immigrants to resist mechanisms of state control. In the 2007 hearing, supporters of
the DREAM Act utilized discourses of fear to highlight the injustices of detaining and
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deporting undocumented youth. They described the pain and anxiety resulting from the
fear of deportation and family separation, making known the experiences of those living
in the shadows cast by restrictive immigration policies. However, these panelists had
previously stated their desire to become staunch members of the same society responsible
for their fear; therefore, their testimonies lacked the rhetorical power needed to overturn
centuries of state control. The following section investigates the strategic shortcomings of
immigrant panelists who used discourses of fear to challenge mechanisms of internal
enforcement.
“We Are Powerless Victims”: Maintaining State Control over Immigrant Bodies
A primary rhetorical strategy of DREAM Act supporters was to expose the
injustices of restrictive immigration policies through personal narratives of deportation
and detention. As demonstrated in chapter one, policymakers employ fear rhetoric rooted
in racism, xenophobia and classism to justify the state’s implementation of restrictive
immigration policies and internal enforcement. Policies such as the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, the Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 1917, the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, and the
Patriot Act of 2001 have all been influenced by various racist, xenophobic, and classist
discourses that, according to Foucault’s theory of surveillance and power, were designed
to keep so-called threatening immigrants under control through their differentiation and
isolation. 321 In order to draw attention to the prejudices imbedded in fear-driven policy,
the immigrant panelists testifying in the 2007 described their personal experiences with
state control. Their testimony aimed to persuade policymakers “constituted with an
identity and within an ideology” of exclusionary nationalism to consider the effects of
state control from the perspective of the disciplined object. 322
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The immigrant panelists in the 2007 hearing used discourses of fear to describe
their personal experiences with state control in order to highlight the injustices of current
internal enforcement policies. Marline Mwanj Kalaw told of how she lived in constant
fear of the “looming prospect of removal” to a country in Africa where she does not
know the language. 323 Despite her excellent academic record, Kalaw explained how she
could not “escape the stifling nature” of an “immigration nightmare” that had
“marginalized” her for years, sending her at times into “the depths of human frailty.” 324
She stated,
At the same time [you are excelling in school], you are falling apart; you are in
deportation proceedings and you do not know from day-to-day whether the
immigration services will come to your home or not. . . . You still have to try to
survive. You still have to go on. There are no other choices. Your only choice is
to, essentially, give up and be deported to a country you do not know. 325
Kalaw’s statement exposed the lack of power undocumented immigrant youth have over
their lives. They are completely dominated by the fear of state control, and managing the
fear and anxiety resulting from this domination has become a matter of survival. As
Foucault explains, “the formal homogeneity of power . . . corresponds [to] the general
form of submission in the one who is constrained by it. . . . A legislative power on one
side, and an obedient subject on the other.” 326 In the case of immigration, policymakers
constitute immigrants as “[dis]obedient subjects” requiring state control. 327 Since the
very presence of undocumented immigrants in the United States is considered a violation
of the law, these disobedient subjects have no ability to resist state control and have no
choice but to submit to whatever discipline the state establishes over them.
Deportation is the mechanism of state control most feared by undocumented
immigrants. Maria Nazareth Gonzalez explained how her life has been a “roller coaster,”
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her emotions oscillating between feeling like she was “on top of the world” as she lived
out her and her parent’s dream of becoming a “successful young woman,” but also in fear
of being “brought down by the realization that at any moment it can be taken away.” 328
Gonzalez described the emotional challenges resulting from the fear of deportation:
In the course of fighting to remain here, I have been lucky to meet many other
students who would also benefit from the DREAM act. . . . I share with them in
their fear and their pain and uncertainty. I can personally attest to how life in
limbo is no way to live. I have been torn apart from my parents for almost two
years and have been struggling to make it on my own. I know what it is to face
difficulty and how hard it is to fight for your dreams. 329
In an attempt to establish ethos with her audience, Gonzalez revealed the “fear” and
“pain” of having to live with the “uncertainty” of deportation. She constituted herself and
other undocumented youth as powerless victims of state control. Gonzalez told of how
parents had been deported two years previously after a “haze of meetings with attorneys,
hearings and rallies,” and at the time of 2007 hearing, she awaited her forced departure
from the country in June 2008 when her approved petition to defer deportation would
expire. 330 Similarly to Kalaw’s comments, Gonzalez used the personal narrative to
demonstrate the harmful effects of fear-driven policy on immigrants, providing
policymakers an insight into the subjugated experiences of undocumented immigrant
youth.
Kalaw and Gonzalez were unsuccessful in persuading policymakers to end state
control of undocumented youth. Although they attempted to make known their
subjugated experiences with state control, they were ultimately unsuccessful in resisting
or redefining the terms of their powerlessness and failed to shift the public debate on
internal enforcement policies. Moreover, they were doubly victimized by the state—first
for being undocumented living in fear of deportation, and second for having to relive
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their pain by testifying in front of the state institution responsible for their fear. Neither
Kalaw nor Gonzalez prosecuted the hierarchy of power responsible for their subjugation;
therefore, they eliminated any possibility of liberation. For fear of being deported, they
failed to indict the policymakers responsible for their discipline as well as neglected to
call for the emancipation of all immigrants suffering from state control. Instead, they
maintained the inevitability of discipline over powerless immigrant bodies that have “no
choice” but to “go on” and “survive” as a permanent objects of state control.
Additionally, Kalaw’s and Gonzalez’s earlier testimony expressing their strong desires to
become staunch members of the same society responsible for their subjugation
delegitimized any potential critique of that society. As a result, their attempts to garner
sympathy and support from policymakers to end the deportation of undocumented
immigrant youth lacked the rhetorical power needed to challenge their subjugation and
ignite a public critique of internal enforcement policies.
Not only did the panelists in the 2007 hearing fail to challenge their subjugation
under state control, policymakers in support of the DREAM Act also neglected to critique
their own mechanisms of internal enforcement. Serving as members of the state, these
policymakers did little to redirect internal enforcement’s object of control and, instead,
reaffirmed the criminalization of the immigrant within the narrative of exclusionary
nationalism. For example, a primary rhetorical strategy employed by policymakers
speaking in support of the DREAM Act was to highlight the innocence of undocumented
immigrant youth. Representative Zoe Lofgren stated, “Fairness and justice have always
been hallmarks of our great Nation. We should not penalize these children for the acts of
their parents.” 331 Not only did Lofgren infantilize the immigrant panelists again by
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referring to undocumented immigrant youth as “children,” she also propagated centuries
of restrictivist rhetoric responsible for the criminalization of unwanted immigrants.
As demonstrated in chapter one, discourses of exclusionary nationalism have
historically been used by policymakers to constitute undesirable immigrants as criminals,
justifying the implementation of restrictive policies such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882, the Mexican Deportation Drive in the 1930’s, and most recently the Patriot Act of
2001. Lofgren continued this dominant rhetorical construction of immigrants as criminals
by insinuating undocumented youth are innocent bystanders to the unlawful “acts of their
parents.” This rhetorical strategy failed to liberate undocumented immigrants from the
injustices of state control because it perpetuates their illegality, limiting the possibility for
future reform aimed at increasing access to citizenry for these subjugated peoples.
Although Lofgren attempted to frame undocumented youth as blameless victims unjustly
disciplined by the state, she ultimately maintained existing power relations by reinforcing
exclusionary nationalist definitions of immigrant criminality.
Another rhetorical shortcoming employed by policymakers who supported the
DREAM Act was to constitute the bill within the context of imagined national values.
Representative William D. Delahunt (D-MA) exemplified this strategy when stating,
Law is a process of change and a reflection of hopefully moral principles. Just
imagine in these cases, would it be moral to send these three young women to a
place that they have never been, where they don’t speak the language, where they
don’t understand the culture? You know, America, above all, is a moral
country. . . . America is great because America is good. 332
Delahunt drew upon the rhetorically imagined national value “morality” to indicate
current deportation laws defy this shared ideal. In doing so, he maintained the myth of
American exceptionalism and insinuated that the “places,” or home countries, of the
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immigrant women were morally inferior to the United States. Not only did Delahunt
reinforce existing power relations over “lesser” immigrants and their cultures, he also
brought forth a weak rhetorical strategy that is easily manipulated by opponents to justify
internal enforcement policies. The vague values of “morality” and upholding America’s
“greatness” are often co-opted by opponents of the DREAM Act to make the case for
deporting immigrant “criminals” who threaten the so-called moral integrity of the United
States. Here, Delahunt handed opponents a rhetorical strategy that could be used to indict
the same undocumented immigrants he attempted to liberate, and he was unsuccessful in
constituting undocumented youth as being undeserving of state control. Delahunt failed
to frame undocumented youth as valuable human beings deserving of participation in the
national narrative. Instead, he constituted them as pawns of White America’s so-called
morality whose fate remains under the control of a benevolent state that can choose, or
not, to spare them the hardships of deportation. Thus, the hierarchies of power
responsible for the disciplining of undocumented immigrants remained unchallenged.
The testimony provided by supporters of the DREAM Act in the 2007 hearing
fortified the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism. DREAM Act advocates
failed to reconstitute undocumented immigrants as participants rather than threats to the
national narrative. By taking on the dominant vocabulary and ideology of exclusionary
nationalism as their own, the immigrant panelists were unable to establish themselves as
significant rhetors capable of shifting the public debate on immigration reform to include
the subjugated experiences of immigrants. Their rhetorical strategies did not succeed
challenging Habermas’ concept of an exclusive public sphere, nor do they dismantle the
dominant narrative of exclusionary nationalism responsible for their exclusion.
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Additionally, the supporters failed to introduce any substantial “nonlegitimized
knowledges” to the public debate on immigration reform. 333 Instead, they reified the
same assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist notions American national identity
that perpetuate the subordination of non-White immigrant “Others.”
Although policymakers such as Lofgren and Berman were sympathetic to the
experiences of undocumented immigrant youth and supported the DREAM Act, other
policymakers disagreed with the panelists, arguing for continuing the exclusion of the
immigrant “Other” from the national narrative. Because the 2007 hearing highlighted
supporters of the DREAM Act, only those policymakers present were invited to comment
on the topic. Representative Steve King (R-IA) led the oppositional charge against the
DREAM Act, while Representative Daniel Lungren (R-CA) and Representative John
Conyers (D-MI) added their comments to King’s statements. The following section
analyzes King’s, Lungren’s, and Conyer’s oppositional discourses during the 2007
hearing on the future of undocumented immigrant youth. I demonstrate how these
policymakers reinforced the public dominance of exclusionary nationalism through
classist, racist, and xenophobic discourses. Using their statements as a foundation, I argue
that the primary rhetorical strategy of DREAM Act opponents is to use discourses of
exclusionary nationalism to constitute undocumented immigrants as national threats that
endanger the American identity, national security, and the economy. In addition, I make
connections between their testimonies, the historical debates surrounding immigrant
“Others,” and the American national narrative that excludes them. Throughout this
analysis, I contend that DREAM Act oppositional testimonies represent the dominant
public narratives surrounding immigration reform, thereby diminishing the rhetorical
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strength of counternarratives that argue for the inclusion of immigrant “Others” in the
American identity through the passage of the DREAM Act.
“They are Dangerous”: Reinforcing the Dominant Narrative of Exclusionary
Nationalism to Oppose the DREAM Act
DREAM Act opponents controlled the terms of the immigration debate by
reinforcing classist, racist, and xenophobic narratives of exclusionary nationalism
through narratives emphasizing economic protectionism that criminalize the
undocumented immigrant. The statements of Representatives King, Lungren, and
Conyers during the 2007 hearing exemplified the exclusive national narrative,
perpetuating the elitism of public discourses surrounding the public immigration debate
and reducing the narrative power of undocumented immigrants attempting to resist their
exclusion from the American identity.
King’s statements in the 2007 hearing reified the exclusivity and narrative
dominance of the Anglicized American national identity. Much like the concerns
expressed by the Founding Fathers regarding the effects of uncontrolled immigration on
the national narrative, policymakers speaking out against the DREAM Act feared the
influx of undocumented immigrants threatened the security of the nation. For instance,
King asked,
What should the population of the United States be in 25 years or 50 years? Who
should be allowed to come to the United States, and who should be sent back to
the country of their origin? . . . Should that immigration policy be set by people
who come here illegally and the mass of those numbers weighs on our
consciences so much that we are willing to sacrifice the essential pillar of
American civilization, American exceptionalism, called the rule of law? . . . We
have an obligation to the destiny of the United States of America, and we need to
move it to a higher destiny, not a lower destiny. 334
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King’s civilizationist rhetoric emulated those of the Founding Fathers that argued
unwanted immigrants jeopardize the continued dominance of the White national
narrative. His call to protect “American exceptionalism” mirrored Thomas Jefferson’s
racist and classist plea to restrict immigration in order to maintain a “homogenous, more
peaceable, more durable” government. 335 King argued non-White undocumented
immigrants threaten the “pillar of American civilization . . . called the rule of law,”
thereby endangering the stability and security of the nation. By framing the “mass” of
non-White undocumented immigrants as threats to White America’s “destiny,” he
reinforced the same xenophobic discourses that have excluded unwanted immigrants
from participating in the national identity since the country’s inception. As a result, King
employed Foucault’s concept that the power of the state relies on the “insidious
[objectification]” of those who threaten its stability, thereby maintaining the need for
state control via restrictive immigration policies and weakening the rhetorical power of
those arguing for the DREAM Act. 336
In addition to constituting undocumented immigrants as dangerous to the
“essential pillar of American civilization,” King drew upon classist discourses of
exclusionary nationalism to construct the unwanted immigrants as economic competitors.
As demonstrated in chapter one, classist claims of economic protectionism are ultimately
rooted in racism. Similar to the claims of White laborers in the 1800’s that non-White
immigrant workers competing for employment threatened their unstable class position,
King argued the DREAM Act would set up a “special protected status,” creating
“disadvantages for citizens who . . . presumably pay taxes and are engaged in the
responsibilities of citizenship.” 337 Rather than investigating the racist processes by which
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undocumented immigrant youth came to be so marginalized that they might actually need
a “protected status” to liberate themselves from their position of powerlessness, King
reinforced the classist myth of the American Dream that correlates financial success with
individual aptitude and performance. Such claims ignore the racial hierarchies privileging
White citizens over non-White immigrants and, instead, provide a non-controversial,
utilitarian argument to explain the economic disparities between racial groups.
Additionally, King’s statements ignored the overwhelming evidence that
undocumented immigrants pay billions in nonrefundable taxes annually, inferring that
undocumented immigrants are not worthy of participating in the “responsibilities of
citizenship” because they evade state-defined acts of citizenry such as paying taxes. 338
His rhetorical strategy connected paying taxes to being a responsible American, diverting
attention from the racism of the state by upholding the classist definition of citizenship
and establishing an invisible line of exclusion between those who follow the so-called
“rules of citizenship” and those who break them.
King further reinforced classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism by framing
in-state tuition as an unfair discount given to undocumented students over U.S. citizens.
He suggested the DREAM Act would give those who are “unlawfully present” a “tuition
discount that is greater and disproportional to that of a citizen who might live in another
State,” creating an “inequity” that privileges unwanted immigrants over citizens. 339 This
statement referred erroneously to in-state tuition as a “discount” for which citizens from
another state are not eligible. Even if the DREAM Act were to have passed, individual
states would decide whether or not to grant in-state tuition rates to previously
undocumented students. Additionally, citizens from other states would have remained
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ineligible for in-state tuition based on university residency requirements that often require
a student graduate from a state high school and reside in the state for a designated amount
of time. 340 King’s arguments that an “inequity” would be created is false; however, by
propagating the myth of the tuition “discount,” he maintained the rhetorical image of the
undocumented immigrant as an economic competitor who threatens the privileged status
of the American elite. King focused on protecting the economic privileges of the
American identity, discounting the racial hierarchies responsible for class inequalities.
His use of classist discourses to justify the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from
the national narrative ultimately reinforced exclusionary nationalism as the dominant
public narrative influencing immigration policy.
Critics of the DREAM Act not only used classist discourses to reify American
exceptionalism and constitute undocumented immigrants as economic competitors, they
also drew upon xenophobic notions of exclusionary nationalism to criminalize these
subordinated people. Just as policymakers constructed the Mexican immigrant as
inherently criminal in order to justify the Mexican Repatriation Drive in the 1930’s,
policymakers arguing against the DREAM Act during the 2007 hearing utilized
criminalized undocumented immigrants to rationalize their exclusion from the American
identity. Echoing the xenophobic rhetoric of the 1981 SCIRP report that “illegality breeds
illegality,” policymakers testifying in the 2007 hearing argued the DREAM Act will
encourage breaking the law and jeopardize the so-called integrity of what it means to be
an American. 341 For example, Representative Lungren questioned,
If we were to pass the DREAM Act . . . should we legislators be concerned
about . . . [encouraging] others to continue to break the law and come here giving
their children the best gift they could possibly give them. . . . We must close the
back door of illegal immigration so that we can open the front door of legal
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immigration . . . if we don’t control illegal immigration, the sentiment in the
country may very well be to slam the door on legal immigration. And what do
you say to someone who, let us say was from Vietnam or the Congo or
somewhere else who didn’t come here illegally, but stayed in their country and
waited for the number to come up to allow them to come here? 342
Lungren perpetuated the dominance of the American national narrative over all others by
calling it the “best gift” a parent can give to their child. Additionally, he argued that
providing a path to citizenship to those who “break the law” would encourage more
immigrants to enter illegally. Mirroring the rhetoric used in the SCIRP report, he
highlighted the state’s responsibility to “close the back door of illegal immigration”
through mechanisms of surveillance and control such as increased border security and
internal enforcement policies. This metaphor assumed only two doors for immigrants—
the “front door” of legal immigration including family unification, refugees, education,
and authorized employment; and the “back door” through which undocumented, or
unwanted, immigrants must sneak through without permission. By rhetorically
constructing undocumented immigrants as devious criminals slipping through the “back
door” of state control, Lungren diminished the human experience of undocumented
immigrants to that of their illegally entry and constructed them as inherently criminal.
Thus, he reasoned providing a path to legal status for undocumented youth would reward
and encourage the continuance of so-called “criminal behavior” and weaken the
American national narrative.
To strengthen Representative Lungren’s argument that illegal immigration
threatens the national narrative, Representative King utilized xenophobic discourses of
fear to make rhetorical connections between the undocumented immigrant “criminal” and
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the weakening of national security. For example, King addressed the three immigrant
women panelists after they provided their testimonies:
I revere this rule of law, and I think one of the reasons that you are all here is to
escape that lack of rule of law in the countries that you left, and so I do not
want to recreate the circumstances here in the United States where slowly we
erode this rule of law that is the attraction that brings such talented people here to
the United States. 343
King objectified the panelists as people who “erode” the rule of law and, therefore,
“erode” the sacred American identity. Similar to the policymakers in the 1800’s claiming
Chinese laborers “[endangered] the good order of certain localities” because they traveled
from corrupt countries, King insinuated all undocumented immigrants are from “lawless” countries and threaten the national security of the United States by their very
presence. 344 As discussed in chapter one, Foucault has argued that a government must be
able to manage its population through discipline in order to maintain sovereignty. 345
According to this assumption, policymakers who fail to maintain the so-called “rule of
law” also fail to uphold sovereignty and, more importantly, are at risk for losing their
position of power. Here, King played on the fears of policymakers who worry about
losing their authority by reducing the undocumented immigrant to a national threat
requiring state control. Furthermore, he strengthened the dominance of the narrative of
exclusionary nationalism by constituting undocumented immigrants as law-less people
whose uncontrolled presence threatens the government’s power over the national
narrative.
In addition to using racist, xenophobic, and classist discourses of exclusionary
nationalism to constitute undocumented immigrants as national threats, critics of the
DREAM Act established an imagined public voice for the “American people” that
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excludes undocumented immigrants from its purview. Chapter one demonstrated that the
American identity is rooted in racist assumptions of White national loyalty and has
excluded those who challenge these assumptions from its participation. Since the
country’s inception, policymakers have rhetorically created a homogenous national ideal
for the public modeled after their own exclusive interpretations of citizenship. They then
used this imagined ideal to frame the dominant public opinion as being the shared
opinion of the “American people” in order to influence policy and sway voters; however,
this narrow concept of the “American people” rarely constituted an accurate
representation of public opinion. Despite its inherent flaws, the concept of the “American
people” remains a dominant rhetorical strategy in political testimony. Speaking to the
House Subcommittee during the 2007 hearing, Representative Conyers draws upon the
imagined concept of the “American people”:
You reminded me that also the American people weigh in on these decisions. It
isn’t really just us Senators and us Congresspersons. The American people are
influencing us as well. So they are looking and listening trying to get this
straight. Should we keep these people? Everybody wants to come to America.
You know, there is a line. We got to draw the line somewhere. 346
Conyers rhetorically separated the “American people” from “these [undocumented]
people.” Additionally, he constituted “these [undocumented] people” as a material
commodity that the “American people” can choose to keep or discard. He rhetorically
drew a “line” around who is included in the imagined national ideal, and who is
excluded. As a result, Conyers maintained the exclusivity of the American identity while
further reducing the undocumented immigrant to a powerless object unworthy of
citizenry and requiring state control to keep them on the right side of the “line.”
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The oppositional testimonies in the 2007 hearing emphasized exclusionary
nationalism as the dominant narrative shaping public debate on the DREAM Act and
immigration reform. Policymakers used classist and xenophobic discourses to constitute
the undocumented immigrant as a criminal that endangered American exceptionalism and
economic security. Their narratives not only excluded undocumented immigrants from
the American identity, they also constructed them in opposition to the national ideal. As a
result, the oppositional narratives eliminated the possibility for panelists to express
counternarratives during the debate. By controlling the terms of the debate, these
policymakers maintained the dominance of exclusionary nationalism and ensured the
continued exclusion of unwanted immigrant “Others” from the national narrative.
Conclusion
As the 2007 hearing on the future of undocumented immigrant youth
demonstrates, the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism remains unchallenged
in contemporary political discourse surrounding immigration reform. The public debate
on the DREAM Act is controlled by assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist
discourses constituting undocumented immigrants as national threats. Foucault explains,
“Discursive practices . . . are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns
for general behavior, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms
which, at once, impose and maintain them.” 347 In the case of immigration, discourses of
exclusionary nationalism are both embodied in and maintained by the state through
policy. For centuries, policymakers have utilized exclusive rhetoric to justify restrictive
immigration policies and maintain strict internal enforcement laws. This trend continues
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within the DREAM Act debates where the narrative of exclusionary nationalism
dominates public discourse in the hearing room and society at large.
The failure of DREAM Act supporters to challenge exclusionary nationalism is
due in part to the fact that the power of participants speaking at congressional hearings is
far from equitably distributed. Rhetorician Valérie Fridland explains that formal legal
spaces such as a courtroom or hearing room create a context where “the negotiation of
discourse and discursive expression rests in the mouths of those granted the institutional
authority to speak.” 348 In a congressional hearing room, policymakers constitute those
with the institutional authority to speak while witnesses remain controlled and censored
by the state’s gaze. Drawing from Foucault’s notion of truth and power, the authority of
policymakers in a congressional hearing room ensures that they have complete
jurisdiction over the knowledge created. Not only do policymakers select which
witnesses to invite and, most importantly, which to exclude, they also control the
schedule, procedures, and organization of the meeting. This exertion of state power over
the hearing room creates a rhetorical space in which witnesses rarely, despite their often
central position as an actual participant in the circumstances leading the hearing, qualify
as an authority.
Due to the unequal distribution of power within the congressional hearing room,
the dominance of exclusionary nationalism within public DREAM Act debates remains
unchallenged. Drawing on centuries of assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist
rhetoric, opponents of the DREAM Act control the terms of the debate both in congress
and for the general public. Their position of power over the debate eliminates the
possibility for the politicization of subjugated knowledge, especially within the
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congressional hearing room. This hierarchy of power favors an elite, exclusionary
nationalist notion of American identity over all others and ensures the continued
marginalization of any dissenting narrative. As a result, subordinated immigrants remain
powerless under state control, limiting the possibility for implementing immigration
policies aimed at increasing their access to the exclusive national narrative.
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Conclusion
Challenging Exclusionary Nationalism by (Re)Constituting the Immigrant Body

Although the DREAM Act movement has gained momentum over the past few
years, advocates continue to fail to get the votes needed to pass the bill. The DREAM Act
originated as a set of provisions to be included in comprehensive immigration reform
(CIR) bills; however, advocates grew weary of the possibility for CIR to gain the bipartisan support needed to pass and decided to push the DREAM Act forward as a standalone bill. As a result, DREAM Act advocates split from the larger reform movement led
by groups such as Reform Immigration FOR America (RIFA), La Raza, and the National
Immigration Law Center (NILC). This shift in strategy has brought more public attention
to the DREAM Act, but has yet to prove successful in Congress.
Undocumented immigrant youth are among the most disenchanted with
comprehensive immigration reform prospects. They believe that the “CIR strategy has
utterly failed . . . relying on disinterested Democrats to push immigration reform forward
has failed. . . . Incremental reform is the best option now, especially the DREAM Act.” 349
To counter the efforts of RIFA, La Raza, and the NILC to push for comprehensive
immigration reform, undocumented immigrant youth have attempted to establish a
separate political movement advocating solely for the passage of the DREAM Act. These
youth have created organizations such as DREAM Activist, National Immigrant Youth
Alliance (NIYA), and the United We Dream Network (UWD), focusing on “leadership
development, organizing, policy advocacy, alliance building, training and capacity
building . . . at the local, state, and national levels.” 350 Although these groups are youth-
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led, they are operating outside of the larger CIR movement only in mission since they
still receive funding and accreditation from RIFA, La Raza, and NILC. Unfortunately,
this fragmentation of DREAM Act advocacy efforts form the larger CIR movement limits
the rhetorical and political power of marginalized undocumented immigrants and their
allies. By redirecting their rhetorical and political strategies to focus only on the DREAM
Act, youth advocates reduce their strength in numbers and, in turn, diminish their ability
to establish widespread solidarity capable of producing social change.
In addition to weakening their political power by isolating themselves from the
CIR debate and focusing on a narrow and incremental goal, DREAM Act advocates
employ rhetorical strategies that hinder their ability to encourage long term social change
for all immigrants. According to rhetorician Maurice Charland, knowing how to
manipulate constitutive rhetoric is crucial for advocates trying to “interpolate” or
“persuade” audiences to adopt an ideology in order to spur social change. 351 To
successfully interpolate an audience within a shared ideology, advocates must use the
narratives that constitute the audience as a “coherent subject.” 352 In the case of
immigration, DREAM Act advocates draw upon the dominant narrative of exclusionary
nationalism in an attempt to constitute themselves as participants of the same American
identity shared by policymakers. This rhetorical strategy is an attempt to create an
imagined solidarity among undocumented immigrant youth and policymakers and is used
to encourage policymakers to empathize with the plight of undocumented immigrant
youth. Unfortunately, by adopting the narrative responsible for their subjugation rather
than establishing their own counternarrative, they ultimately reinforce the future
exclusion of non-White immigrant “Others” from the American identity.
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The following section investigates the ways in which DREAM Act supporters and
their allies utilize “failed constitutive rhetoric” that uphold the dominance of exclusionary
nationalism and weaken the rhetorical strength of those immigrants furthest away from
the status quo. 353 First, DREAM Act advocates fail to constitute a new definition of
American identity outside of the dominant narrative of exclusionary nationalism. Second,
I demonstrate that in adopting assimilationist rhetoric, DREAM Act advocates silence the
expression of their subjugated knowledge through counternarratives. Finally, I argue that
failed constitutive rhetoric neglects to challenge existing power relations and, therefore,
lessen the possibility for long-term social change.
Failed Constitutive Rhetoric: Reinforcing the Narrative of
Exclusionary Nationalism
The rhetorical strategies employed by DREAM Act supporters create
“constitutive paradoxes” that reify their subordination as “Others” rather than resist the
exclusivity of the American identity. Rhetorician Kenneth Burke explains that a
“constitutive paradox” occurs when groups attempting to define a new audience and
reconstitute their identities actually “usher in precisely the gloom they thought they were
ushering out.” 354 Although DREAM Act advocates attempt to usher out the
discriminatory beliefs alienating them from the American identity, they actually
contribute to their continued exclusion from this identity by upholding the discourses of
exclusionary nationalism. In an attempt to persuade policymakers to pass the DREAM
Act, advocates perpetuate an assimilationist, racist, xenophobic, and classist public
position on immigration reform that is diametrically opposed to the long-term social
transformation they hope to achieve.
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DREAM Act supporters enact failed constitutive rhetoric when they uphold an
exclusionary nationalist, homogenous notion of American identity rather than providing a
new definition of the American identity that embraces difference. As demonstrated in
chapter one, the Founding Fathers established an exclusive American national identity
modeled after Anglicized, elitist ideologies. They intentionally excluded non-Anglo
Saxon immigrants whose “language” and “principles of government” they left behind
were believed to “warp and bias” the new direction of the national community,
threatening to leave it a “heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.” 355 For the centuries
to follow, policymakers used restrictive immigration policies such as the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, the Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 1917, and the Johnson-Reed Act
of 1924 to exclude non-White immigrants believed to threaten the homogeneity of the
Anglicized American identity. Today, the same strategies are employed by policymakers
to ensure the strength of a state-controlled American identity.
The exclusive American identity is rooted in racist and classist assumptions of
exclusionary nationalism, reigning over the national community and informing the
contemporary debate on immigration reform. Contemporary discourses of exclusionary
nationalism continue to constitute undocumented immigrants as “a serious national
security problem,” thereby rationalizing their marginalization from the American identity
and the social status it affords its members. 356 Chapter two demonstrates how DREAM
Act supporters do little to change the marginalized position of undocumented immigrants.
Supporters focus on assimilation instead of redefining the American identity in a way that
would include subjugated “Others,” embrace difference, and consider heterogeneity a
strength rather than a threat to national sovereignty. They perpetuate the same
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assimilationist and classist assumptions that limit the participation in the American
identity to those who “speak wonderful English. . . . have great educations. . . . who are
assimilated and who love America.” 357 By upholding the exclusionary nationalist
discourses informing the American identity, DREAM Act supporters all but ensure the
continued social and economic marginalization of those immigrants furthest from the
status quo.
A second way in which DREAM Act advocates employ failed constitutive
rhetoric is by neglecting to express their subjugated knowledge through
counternarratives. Feminist scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak draws on Foucault and
Deleuze to explain that “the oppressed . . . can speak and know their conditions,”
however the real question is whether or not the oppressed will actually articulate these
conditions in a way that encourages political solidarity through alliance. 358 As
demonstrated in the 2007 hearing, DREAM Act supporters fail to speak of their
“conditions” as marginalized “Others” in a way that encourages political solidarity.
Rather than focusing on their personal experiences as immigrant “Others” and
highlighting their immigrant values, traditions, and beliefs to demonstrate how these
attributes positively contribute to the American community, they downplay their
foreignness and frame themselves as the “ultimate Americans” willing to abandon their
unique heritage in exchange for participating in the Anglicized national narrative. 359
Their cultural uniqueness is traded for an idealized notion of “American,” extinguishing
any ability to build political solidarity based on the shared subjugated knowledge of
immigrant “Others.” As reinforced in the 2007 congressional hearing, undocumented
immigrant youth “repeat the Pledge of Allegiance, liberty and just for all. They root for
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their favorite baseball and football teams, and they ponder their future.” 360
Undocumented immigrant youth constitute themselves as White in order to convince
policymakers that they deserve access to the (White) privileges of citizenry.
Legal scholar Clare Sheridan explains Mexican immigrants and their American
descendents intentionally frame themselves as the “other white race,” grouping
themselves with other “nationality groups” such as Germans or Czechs that are
recognized as White in order to gain access to legal and material White privilege. 361 This
strategy also distinguishes them from what they consider to be lower class, “less desirable
groups” such as blacks, Native Americans, and Chinese. 362 Thus, Mexican immigrants
and their American descendents rely on existing racial hierarchies that reinforce a
dichotomous perception of race as being either black or White so that when they self
identify as White, they constitute themselves within rather than outside privilege.
However, in focusing on assimilation and constituting themselves as White, they neglect
to politicize their subjugated knowledge. Consequently, they reinforce the same power
relations responsible for their exclusion and, as a result, all but ensure the continued
economic and social marginalization of non-White immigrant “Others” from the national
narrative.
Failing to create a new definition of “American” that embraces the subjugated
knowledge of immigrant “Others” weakens the possibility for non-White immigrant
“Others” to control the terms of the public debate on immigration reform. As
demonstrated in chapter two, the unequal power distributions within the congressional
hearing room make the process of giving congressional testimony an unlikely occasion
for the expression of subjugated knowledge. Foucault’s notion of truth and power
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explains that the authority of policymakers in a congressional hearing room ensures that
they have complete jurisdiction over the knowledge created in that space. As a result,
witnesses rarely qualify as significant rhetors informing the debate within the hearing
room. This lack of control over the formal debate on immigration reform guarantees nonWhite immigrant “Other” will never have the authority to resist their position of
powerlessness in the congressional hearing room. Unless these marginalized immigrants
begin to constitute a significant public outside of state-controlled spaces, policymakers
enacting the narrative of exclusionary nationalism will continue to control the public
debate on immigration reform.
Despite the rhetorical shortcomings of using assimilationist rhetoric that focuses
on ways undocumented youth “identify with the American culture, speak English
fluently, and . . . are patriotic and love this country,” this is the only rhetorical strategy
currently available to undocumented youth. 363 As long as undocumented youth lack legal
status, they lack the legal protections required to form a more radical movement that
challenges exclusionary nationalism. The following section explains the political
necessity of DREAM Act supporters to continue using failed constitutive rhetoric until
undocumented youth obtain legal status. First, I explain how using assimilationist
discourses might advance the passage of the DREAM Act, even if the strategy limits
future immigration reform. I argue that in the short term, incremental change provided by
the DREAM Act would allow qualifying undocumented youth to become legitimate
members of the system, and, in turn, create the space needed for a radical movement that
could more ardently resist the subordination of all non-White immigrant “Others.” Next, I
call for the future reunification of immigrant youth with the larger comprehensive
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immigration reform movement as well as the creation of multiracial coalitions. I argue
long-term social change for all non-White immigrant “Others” will only be achieved
through a large-scale, radical social movement that takes place outside of state-controlled
spaces and publicly resists the Anglo-Saxonized notion of American identity. Finally, I
suggest these future coalitions should focus on politicizing their subjugated knowledge in
order to dismantle the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism and liberate
themselves from their marginalized position.
Towards a New Radicalism: Using Assimilationist Discourses to Create
Future Possibilities of Resistance
Since DREAM Act supporters fail to challenge the narrative dominance of
exclusionary nationalism and, instead, uphold existing power relations that privilege elite
notions of American identity, the passage of the DREAM Act would do little to redirect
the long-term public debate on immigration reform. However, until undocumented youth
obtain the protections afforded by legal status, they have few options outside of using
assimilationist discourse to fight for incremental change. Therefore, using assimilationist
discourses to pass the DREAM Act is a rhetorical necessity that can only be rectified
after undocumented immigrant youth are legally legitimized.
Using assimilationist discourses fails to challenge the narrative dominance of
exclusionary nationalism and limits the possibility of long-term social change, but this
rhetorical strategy is needed in the interim to advance the passage of the DREAM Act.
Undocumented immigrant youth who qualify for legal status under the DREAM Act are
culturally distinct from than their parents who migrated as adults. As demonstrated in the
2007 hearing, many undocumented immigrant youth enter the United States at very
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young ages and have adopted the language and cultural values associated with the
American identity such. As a result, these youth identify with the Anglo-Saxonized
American culture before they identify with the foreign culture of their parents. This
cultural amalgamation allows them to more easily frame themselves as members rather
than outcasts of the American national narrative, attracting public attention to the
situation of these “Americanized” youth and establishing empathy among policymakers.
For example, empathetic policymakers identify with these immigrant youth, stating,
“You are not much different than I am . . . you are patriotic and love this country like I do
. . . little difference remains between you and me.” 364 By drawing on assimilationist
discourse to constitute themselves as “coherent subjects” worthy of citizenship,
undocumented immigrant youth interpolate policymakers to see them as Americans who
deserve an opportunity to obtain legal status, increasing the possibility for the DREAM
Act to pass.
Using assimilationist discourses to pass the DREAM Act as a stand-alone bill
reinforces the marginalization of all other non-White immigrant “Others;” however, legal
status is required before undocumented youth can employ a more radical rhetoric. The
DREAM Act only benefits those who demonstrate their ability to assimilate into
American culture via their length of stay in the United States, academic success, military
service, or pursuit of higher education. These requirements fail to address the needs of
those immigrants furthest away from the status quo, such as the criminalized, uneducated
parents of undocumented immigrant youth; therefore, a more radical movement is needed
to liberate all non-White immigrant “Others.” However, until undocumented immigrant
youth obtain legal status, they are unable to employ radical rhetoric to challenge

120

exclusionary nationalism or resist state control. Without legal status, undocumented
immigrants are unable to engage in legal employment, they are banned from participating
in public benefits such as certain health, financial, and education services, and, more
importantly, they risk detention and deportation each and every day. 365 According to
legal scholar Catherine L. Merino, undocumented immigrants make up a “subclass” that
is “in a particularly vulnerable position relative to . . . legalized aliens.” 366 She explains
voluntary surrender is not a viable option for unauthorized aliens because deportation
“carries serious, life-long consequences” including felony prosecutions and the barring of
future legal entry into the United States. 367 Thus, until they achieve legal status, most
undocumented immigrants are unwilling to risk deportation by publicly protesting their
marginalization. Legal legitimization is required before these immigrants shift their
rhetorical strategies towards a new radicalism that will challenge the narrative dominance
of exclusionary nationalism.
If the DREAM Act passes and undocumented immigrant youth achieve legal
legitimization and protection, they must reunite with the larger movement for
comprehensive immigration reform as well as establish multiracial coalitions that seek
justice for all racially excluded “Others.” Black feminist Audre Lorde argues that
marginalized groups must “make common cause with those others identified as outside
the structures in order to define and seek a world in which we can all flourish.” 368
Undocumented youth must reconnect with those “Others” within the Hispanic and larger
immigrant communities, especially those immigrants who may be furthest away from the
status quo. Additionally, they should form coalitions with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transsexual (LGBT) immigrant activists who are fighting for marriage equality and the
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recognition of same-sex union within immigration policy. 369 These coalitions must be
multiracial and address the marginalization of all non-White “Others” from the national
narrative if they are to succeed in challenging the homogeneity of the national narrative.
In establishing multiracial coalitions, non-White immigrant “Others” intensify their
rhetorical and political power and create the possibility for a broad-based civil rights
movement.
Despite their political necessity, creating multiracial coalitions will be extremely
challenging due to existing tensions between racial minorities. Legal scholars Kevin R.
Johnson and Bill Ong Hing believe the racism between African American and Latino
communities will be the most challenging to overcome in the formation of a “new, truly
broad-based civil rights movement” that fights for immigrant rights and against the
discrimination of all racial minorities. 370 They explain that perceived job competition
between the two groups combined with a strong sense of cultural nativism contribute to
racial divisions between the two minority groups. Despite their racial tensions, racial
minorities must acknowledge they are all excluded by the same White, capitalist power
structure. Therefore, if they are to dismantle the narrative dominance of exclusionary
nationalism, non-White “Others” must put their racial tensions aside to fight for
liberation together.
In addition to establishing multiracial coalitions, immigrant youth legalized under
the passage of the DREAM Act must trade their current assimilationist discourse for
more radical rhetoric of resistance if they are to defy the exclusion of all non-White
“Others” from the national narrative. As part of this shift towards radical rhetoric, I
suggest they embrace their difference and politicize their subjugated knowledge. Since
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the strategy of assimilation establishes a cultural norm that is blind to difference, it
disadvantages all “Others” whose experience and culture differ from that norm. Social
theorist Iris Marion Young explains, “The real differences between oppressed groups and
the dominant norm . . . tend to put them at a disadvantage in measuring up to these
standards, and for that reason assimilationist policies perpetuate their disadvantage.” 371
Under these circumstances, it is imperative that “Others” politicize their subjugated
knowledge and assert the positivity of group difference.
The act of reclaiming the identity silenced by the dominant culture is not only
liberating and empowering, but also challenges the hegemonic assumptions that one
should reject and devalue his or her difference to become members of that society.
Additionally, politicizing difference forces the “relativizing” of the norm, forcing the
dominant culture to admit to its specificity and debunking the myth that the norm is
neutral and universal. 372 In the case of immigration, non-White immigrant “Others”
should band together with multiracial allies to politicize their collective difference from
the homogenous, Anglo-Saxonized American identity. They should highlight their
personal experiences as “Others” and constitute their unique values, traditions, languages,
and beliefs as contributions rather than threats to the national community. By insisting
whole groups who differ from the norm are deserving of national membership, they will
encourage group solidarity among racial “Others” and move towards eliminating the
hierarchy that privileges an Anglo-Saxonized American identity.
If the DREAM Act passes and undocumented immigrant youth are able to obtain
legal status, these newly legalized advocates must end the use of assimilationist
discourses, form multiracial coalitions, and embrace radical rhetoric of resistance in order
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to challenge the narrative of exclusionary nationalism responsible for their
marginalization. As the fight for immigrant access persists, I encourage researchers,
political activists, policymakers, and subjugated immigrant “Others” to continue
investigating ways in which American nationalism contributes to the rhetorical exclusion
of various populations. In regards to the DREAM Act debate, a much needed area of
investigation would be the 2010 congressional debates regarding the DREAM Act
wherein policymakers reinforced the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism
when arguing for and against the bill. Additionally, future research is needed in the areas
of how institutions such as education systems and the mass media maintain an exclusive
notion of American identity. If the primary goal of the DREAM Act is to provide access
for excluded immigrants, we must need to better understand how these immigrants might
continue to be excluded even after gaining legal access. Finally, a comprehensive study
on how legal status creates divisions among immigrant communities, especially between
legalized and undocumented immigrant youth, would help determine the possibility for
group solidarity if the DREAM Act were to continue to fail. The issue of immigration
reform is complex and involves analyses from varying disciplines and perspectives;
however, research in this area remains critical to the future of our national community.
Only through criticizing the “prevailing knowledge” of the American identity will we
empower ourselves to define “our own realities on our own terms,” changing not only our
individual actions and ideas, but also the hierarchy of power and national identity. 373
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